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CONTEMPORARY PRACTICE OF THE UNITED STATES
RELATING TO INTERNATIONAL LAW
EDITED BY KRISTINA DAUGIRDAS AND JULIAN DAVIS MORTENSON
In this section:
• Congress Overrides Obama’s Veto to Pass Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act
• U.S. Federal Court of Appeals Upholds United Nations’ Immunity in Case Related to
Cholera in Haiti
• U.S.-Russian Agreements on Syria Break Down as the Syrian Conflict Continues
• Russia Suspends Bilateral Agreement with United States on Disposal of Weapons-Grade
Plutonium
• The United States Makes Payment to Family of Italian Killed in CIA Air Strike
• United States Ratifies Hague Convention on the International Recovery of Child Support
and Other Forms of Family Maintenance
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STATE JURISDICTION AND IMMUNITY
Congress Overrides Obama’s Veto to Pass Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act
doi:10.1017/ajil.2016.7
On September 28, 2016, Congress enacted the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act
(JASTA), overriding a presidential veto for the first and only time during Obama’s presi-
dency.1 The Act allows Americans to sue foreign states for playing a role in terrorist attacks
on U.S. soil. While JASTA was written in general terms, it was drafted specifically to allow
families of the victims of the 9/11 attacks to sue Saudi Arabia for its suspected role in those
attacks.2 The Act received widespread bipartisan support despite the administration’s consis-
tent stance that the Act would harm U.S. economic, diplomatic, and national security
interests.
JASTA amends two statutes—the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA)3 and the Anti-
Terrorism Act (ATA)4—to effectively overrule judicial constructions of those statutes that
had foreclosed lawsuits against Saudi Arabia for its alleged support of the 9/11 attacks.
The FSIA establishes that “a foreign state shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the
courts of the United States and of the States.”5 It also carves out a number of exceptions
to such sovereign immunity, including an exception for noncommercial torts.6 This excep-
tion allows an American to sue a foreign state for damages if he or she is injured in the United
States as the result of the tortious conduct of a foreign government, its officials, or its employ-
ees. In litigation against Saudi Arabia related to the 9/11 attacks, U.S. courts had interpreted
this exception narrowly to apply only to tortious conduct occurring entirelywithin the United
States.7 Under this interpretation, a foreign state that commits a tortious act resulting in
injury or damage in the United States remains immune so long as part of the tortious conduct
occurred outside the United States.8
JASTA expands what is known as the “terrorism exception” to the FSIA to implicitly over-
rule this judicial construction when it comes to acts of terrorism. Section 3 of the Act creates a
cause of action for civil claims against foreign states (and their officials, employees, and agents)
1 Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act, Pub. L. No. 114–222, 130 Stat. 852 (2016) (codified at 18 U.S.C.
A. § 2333, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1605B, amending the Anti-Terrorism Act and the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act,
respectively), at https://www.congress.gov/114/plaws/publ222/PLAW-114publ222.pdf [hereinafter JASTA].
2 See, e.g., Steve Vladeck, The 9/11 Civil Litigation and the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act (JASTA), JUST
SECURITY (Apr. 18, 2016), at https://www.justsecurity.org/30633/911-civil-litigation-justice-sponsors-terrorism-
act-jasta.
3 Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, Pub. L. No. 94–583, 90 Stat. 2891 (1977) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§
1130, 1332(a)(4), 1391(f), 1441(d), 1602–1611(2012)) [hereinafter FSIA].
4 Anti-Terrorism Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2333 (2012) [hereinafter ATA].
5 FSIA, supra note 3, § 1604.
6 The noncommercial tort exception provides: “A foreign state shall not be immune . . . in any case . . . in which
money damages are sought against a foreign state for personal injury or death, or damage to or loss of property,
occurring in the United States and caused by the tortious act or omission of that foreign state or of any official or
employee of that foreign state while acting within the scope of his office or employment . . . .” Id. § 1605(a)(5).
Additional exceptions include those based on waivers, commercial activities, and State Department designations of
state-sponsored terrorism. See id. § 1605(a)–(d), § 1605A.
7 See, e.g., In re Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, 714 F.3d 109, 117 (2d. Cir. 2013).
8 Id.
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for committing torts anywhere in the world that contribute to a terrorist attack carried out on
U.S. soil.9 JASTA thus removes the geographic limitation on tort liability established by the
courts, and allows Americans to sue foreign states for tortious conduct occurring abroad that
causes injury or damage in the United States as the result of international terrorism. JASTA
does not, however, authorize lawsuits against foreign states for acts of war or for torts based on
omissions or negligence.10
Section 5 of JASTA establishes a mechanism by which the U.S. government can seek a stay
of proceedings brought against a foreign state under Section 3, referenced above. “[I]f the
Secretary of State certifies that the United States is engaged in good faith discussions with
the foreign state defendant concerning the resolution of the claims against the foreign
state,” the court may stay proceedings against that defendant for up to 180 days.11 Once a
stay is granted, the attorney general may request 180-day extensions, which the court must
grant if the secretary of state recertifies the United States’ engagement in such “good faith
discussions.”12 JASTA does not limit the number of such extensions.
The other statute amended by JASTA—the ATA—establishes a cause of action for U.S.
nationals to obtain treble damages from those responsible for injuries arising out of an act
of international terrorism.13 Section 4 of JASTA adds a new provision to the ATA that explic-
itly allows ATA suits against individuals and entities under theories of secondary liability.14
Specifically, it recognizes liability for aiding and abetting, or conspiring to commit, an act of
international terrorism that is planned, authorized, or executed by a designated foreign ter-
rorist organization.15 This provision in effect overrules previous judicial decisions holding
that the ATA does not encompass secondary liability.16 JASTA applies retroactively to actions
involving injuries dating back to September 11, 2001.17
Both Democratic and Republican lawmakers sponsored JASTA.18 The legislation reflects
bipartisan sympathy for the families of 9/11 victims who want to try Saudi Arabia in U.S.
9 Section 3, in pertinent part, reads: “A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of
the United States in any case in which money damages are sought against a foreign state for physical injury to
person or property or death occurring in the United States and caused by—(1) an act of international terrorism
in the United States; and (2) a tortious act or acts of the foreign state, or of any official, employee, or agent of that
foreign state while acting within the scope of his or her office, employment, or agency, regardless of where the
tortious act or acts of the foreign state occurred.” See JASTA, supra note 1, § 3(b).
10 Id. § 3(d).
11 Id. § 5(c).
12 Id. § 5(c)(2)(B)(ii).
13 ATA, supra note 4. Section 2333(a) provides: “Any national of the United States injured in his or her person,
property, or business by reason of an act of international terrorism, or his or her estate, survivors, or heirs, may sue
therefor in any appropriate district court of the United States and shall recover threefold the damages he or she
sustains . . . .” Id.
14 See JASTA, supra note 1, § 4. JASTA does not expand the secondary-liability cause of action to foreign states.
See id. § 4(d)(1) (limiting secondary liability to “persons” as defined in 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2012)).
15 Id. § 4.
16 See, e.g., Rothstein v. UBS AG, 708 F.3d 82, 98 (2d Cir. 2013); Boim v. Holy Land Found. for Relief &
Dev., 549 F.3d 685 (7th Cir. 2008).
17 JASTA, supra note 1, § 7.
18 The bill, S. 2040, was cosponsored by Sens. Chuck Schumer, D-New York, and John Cornyn, R-Tex. See
JASTA, supra note 1.
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courts—and who are unsatisfied by the conclusion of the 9/11 Commission, which found
“no evidence that the Saudi government as an institution or senior Saudi officials individually
funded [Al Qaeda].”19
Despite widespread sympathy for the 9/11 victims and their families, the Obama admin-
istration opposed the measure, expressing concern about the possibility of unintended
consequences.
Prior to the passage of the bill, the White House consistently objected to JASTA due to its
dilution of foreign sovereign immunity and its global implications for U.S. economic, diplo-
matic, and national security interests. “The whole notion of sovereign immunity is at stake,”
said White House Press Secretary Josh Earnest.20 “[S]overeign immunity is something that
protects the ability of the United States to work closely with countries all around the world.
And walking back that principle would put the United States, our taxpayers and our service
members and diplomats at risk.”21
One of the administration’s main concerns was that other countries would enact
reciprocal measures and open their courts to similar claims against the United States
and U.S. officials.22 As noted by President Obama in a letter to Senate Minority
Leader Harry Reid, such lawsuits could have far-reaching repercussions: they could impli-
cate Americans based on mere accusations of conduct violating foreign laws; they could
lead to time-consuming discovery demands for sensitive intelligence information; and
they could result in the attachment of U.S. government assets abroad.23 Moreover,
given the United States’ large international presence, the administration warned that
reciprocal legislation would likely have a larger impact on U.S. interests than those of
any other country.24
The administration also worried that JASTA would remove decisions about foreign states’
involvement in terrorism—weighty decisions with serious diplomatic consequences—from
the purview of the executive branch and delegate them instead to private litigants and courts.
President Obama cautioned that such privatization could invite decisions that are inconsis-
tent or based on incomplete information.25 Prior to JASTA, only the secretary of state had
the authority to abrogate a foreign state’s immunity arising from potential involvement
19 NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 171 (2004), at http://
www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf. See also FBI 9/11 REVIEW COMM’N, THE FBI: PROTECTING THE
HOMELAND IN THE 21ST CENTURY 101 (2015) (finding that “there is no new information to date that would alter
the original findings of the 9/11 Commission regarding the individuals responsible for the 9/11 attacks or for
supporting those responsible for the attacks”).
20 White House Press Release, Press Briefing by Press Secretary Josh Earnest (Apr. 18, 2016), at https://www.
whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/04/18/press-briefing-press-secretary-josh-earnest-4182016 [hereinafter
Apr. 18 Press Briefing].
21 Id.
22 SeeWhite House Press Release, VetoMessage from the President – S.2040 (Sept. 23, 2016), at https://www.
whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/09/23/veto-message-president-s2040 (“Indeed, reciprocity plays a sub-
stantial role in foreign relations, and numerous other countries already have laws that allow for the adjustment
of a foreign state’s immunities based on the treatment their governments receive in the courts of the other
state.”) [hereinafter Obama Veto Message].
23 Letter from Barack Obama, President of the United States, to Harry Reid, Minority Leader, U.S. Senate, at
https://docs.google.com/viewerng/viewer?url=http://big.assets.huffingtonpost.com/POTUSReidJASTA.pdf
[hereinafter Obama Letter].
24 Id.
25 Id.
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in terrorism; the secretary did so by designating a foreign state as a “state sponsor of terror-
ism.”26 According to the White House, upsetting this “well codified” process could under-
mine the government’s ability to effectively confront governments that sponsor terrorism and
could erode cooperation from diplomatic partners who would be vulnerable to private alle-
gations of terrorist-related activity.27
After both houses of Congress passed the bill, President Obama exercised his veto and
released a message that reiterated his primary concerns:
First, JASTA threatens to reduce the effectiveness of our response to indications that a foreign gov-
ernment has taken steps outside our borders to provide support for terrorism, by taking such mat-
ters out of the hands of national security and foreign policy professionals and placing them in the
hands of private litigants and courts.
. . .
Second, JASTA would upset longstanding international principles regarding sovereign immunity,
putting in place rules that, if applied globally, . . . could lead to suits against the United States or U.
S. officials for actions taken bymembers of an armed group that receivedU.S. assistance, misuse of
U.S. military equipment by foreign forces, or abuses committed by police units that received U.S.
training . . . .
. . .
Third, JASTA threatens to create complications in our relationships with even our closest part-
ners. [By exposing them to potential litigation in U.S. courts,] JASTA threatens to limit their
cooperation on key national security issues, including counterterrorism initiatives, at a crucial
time when we are trying to build coalitions, not create divisions.28
Obama also noted that a number of U.S. allies and partners had expressed “serious con-
cerns” about the law.29 After Congress first passed the bill, the European Union urged the
president to veto the legislation, based on its view that “JASTA would be in conflict with fun-
damental principles of international law and in particular the principles of State sovereign
immunity.”30 Saudi Arabia exerted significant lobbying efforts to try to stop the legislation
and reportedly threatened to sell up to $750 billion in U.S. assets that it thought could be
vulnerable to attachment under JASTA judgments.31 Former members of the Bush, Clinton,
and Obama administrations also spoke up, warning lawmakers that if JASTA was enacted,
26 JASTA, supra note 1, §§ 1605A(a)(2), (h)(6). Currently, only Iran, Sudan, and Syria are designated as “state
sponsors of terrorism.”U.S. Dep’t of State, State Sponsors of Terrorism, at http://www.state.gov/j/ct/list/c14151.
htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2016).
27 See White House Press Release, Press Briefing by Press Secretary Josh Earnest (Sept. 23, 2016), at https://
www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/09/23/press-briefing-press-secretary-josh-earnest-9232016 [herein-
after Sept. 23 Press Briefing]; Obama Letter, supra note 23.
28 Obama Veto Message, supra note 22.
29 Id.
30 Letter from the EU Delegation to the U.S. Dep’t of State (Sept. 19, 2016), at https://www.washingtonpost.
com/news/powerpost/wp-content/uploads/sites/47/2016/09/EU-on-JASTA.pdf [hereinafter EU Letter].
31 See, e.g., Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Fight Between Saudis and 9/11 Families Escalates in Washington, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 21, 2016), at http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/22/us/politics/9-11-saudi-bill-veto-obama.html; White
House Press Release, Press Briefing by Press Secretary Josh Earnest (Sept. 26, 2016), at https://www.white-
house.gov/the-press-office/2016/09/26/press-briefing-press-secretary-josh-earnest-92616-0; Mark Mazzetti,
Saudi Arabia Warns of Economic Fallout if Congress Passes 9/11 Bill, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 15, 2016), at http://
www.nytimes.com/2016/04/16/world/middleeast/saudi-arabia-warns-ofeconomic-fallout-if-congress-passes-9-
11-bill.html.
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“[o]ur national security interests, our capacity to fight terrorism and our leadership role in the
world would be put in serious jeopardy” as well as “our relationship with one of our most
important allies, Saudi Arabia.”32
Despite these warnings, more than two-thirds of both the Senate and House voted to over-
ride Obama’s veto.33 President Obama called the override a “political vote” and a “mistake”
based on lawmakers’ fears of being “perceived as voting against 9/11 families right before an
election.”34 The enactment of the law had immediate effects: within two days, a 9/11 wid-
ower filed a federal lawsuit against the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia based on JASTA.35
After JASTA was enacted, foreign governments again protested that JASTA violates inter-
national law. The Saudi Foreign Ministry stated, it “is of great concern to the community of
nations that object to the erosion of the principle of sovereign immunity, which has governed
international relations for hundreds of years.”36 Russia’s ForeignMinistry described the law as
evincing a “complete disregard for international law” and a “policy of extending [U.S.] juris-
diction to the entire world and ignoring the concept of state sovereignty . . . .”37 The United
Arab Emirates’ Foreign Ministry declared that JASTA is “contrary to general liability rules,”
“not equal with the foundations and principles of relations among states, and represents a
clear violation given its negative repercussions and dangerous precedents.”38
Some international law scholars have also voiced concerns that JASTA violates international
law by exceeding recognized and accepted exceptions to sovereign immunity under custom-
ary international law.39 Other commentators have beenmore cautious about that conclusion,
32 Open Letter fromWilliam S. Cohen et al. to the President of the United States andMembers of Congress, at
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/files/live/sites/almonitor/files/documents/2016/letter_obama_congress_jasta.
pdf. The letter was signed by a number of former national security officers, including William S. Cohen (former
Secretary of Defense to President Clinton), Michael Mukasey (former Attorney General to President George
W. Bush), and Rand Beers (former Homeland Security Adviser to President Obama). Id.
33 The Senate voted 97–1 to override, and the House voted 348–77. See JASTA, supra note 1.
34 Daniella Diaz, Exclusive: Obama Says Congress Made a “Political Vote” Overriding His Veto of Saudi Lawsuit
Bill, CNN (Sept. 28, 2016), at http://www.cnn.com/2016/09/28/politics/obama-override-veto-911-bill-cnn-
presidential-town-hall.
35 See Complaint, Desimone v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, No. 1:16-cv-01944-ABJ (D.D.C. Sept. 30, 2016).
36 Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Ministry of Foreign Affairs Press Release, Official at Ministry of Foreign Affairs:
JASTA Great Concern to Community of Nations Objecting to Erosion of Principle of Sovereign Immunity (Sept.
30, 2016), at http://www.mofa.gov.sa/sites/mofaen/ServicesAndInformation/news/MinistryNews/Pages/
ArticleID201693001814440.aspx.
37 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russ. Fed’n Press Release, Comment by the Information and Press
Department on the US Passing the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act with Extraterritorial Jurisdiction
(Sept. 30, 2016), at http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/
2479122.
38 U.A.E. Ministry of Foreign Affairs & Int’l Cooperation Press Release, UAE Voices Concerns Regarding US
Congress Adoption of Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act (Sept. 12, 2016), at https://www.mofa.gov.ae/
EN/MediaCenter/News/Pages/12916-UAE.aspx.
39 See, e.g., S. 2040, Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act: Hearing on S. 2040 Before the Subcomm. on
the Constitution &Civil Justice, 114th Cong. (July 14, 2016) (statement of Paul B. Stephan), at https://judiciary.
house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Stephan-Testimony-07142016.pdf [hereinafter JASTA Testimony];
Curtis Bradley & Jack Goldsmith, Opinion, Don’t Let Americans Sue Saudi Arabia, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 22,
2016), at http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/22/opinion/dont-let-americans-sue-saudi-arabia.html (“A nation’s
immunity from lawsuits in the courts of another nation is a fundamental tenet of international law. This tenet
is based on the idea that equal sovereigns should not use their courts to sit in judgment of one another. Many
nations have tacitly agreed to limit immunity in specified contexts, such as when they engage in certain commercial
activities. But apart from those exceptions (or where a binding treaty or Security Council resolution otherwise
dictates), international law continues to guarantee immunity, even for alleged egregious crimes.”).
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noting that the imprecise boundaries of the recognized exception to sovereign immunity
for some territorial torts could conceivably cover the circumstances contemplated by
JASTA.40
When asked directly whether JASTA violates international law, theWhite House press sec-
retary sidestepped the question.41 He confirmed that, to his knowledge, it does not violate
any international agreements, but he did not express an official opinion as to whether JASTA
violates customary international law.42 He instead described sovereign immunity as a “legal
concept . . . that countries around the world observe,” and said that “carving out exceptions”
to it puts U.S. service members, diplomats, and companies at “legal risk.”43 This response
conforms with the administration’s other characterizations of sovereign immunity as a “foun-
dational principle of international law” that JASTA threatens to “degrade” or “roll[] back.”44
Immediately after the law’s passage, some members of Congress acknowledged potential
downsides of the legislation.45 Twenty-eight senators signed a letter asking JASTA’s sponsors
to “mitigate th[e] unintended consequences” of the law.46 The White House press secretary
characterized this congressional response as “rapid-onset buyer’s remorse.”47 In the weeks
that followed, State Department representatives expressed their intention to engage with
Congress in figuring out the best way to implement the new law.48
40 SeeWilliam Dodge, Does JASTA Violate International Law?, JUST SECURITY (Sept. 30, 2016), at https://www.
justsecurity.org/33325/jasta-violate-international-law-2 (noting that Article 12 of the UN Convention on
Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Properties—which informs customary international law insofar
as it evidences state practice and opinio juris—excludes sovereign immunity for proceedings related to death, per-
sonal injury or property damage that is, inter alia, attributable to another state and caused by an “act or omission [of
that state, which] occurred in whole or in part in the territory” of the forum state (emphasis added)). But seeDavid
P. Stewart, The UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property, 99 AJIL 194, 206 (2005)
(stating that “it would read far too much into the consensus adoption of the convention to assert that the adoption
of such exceptions in the convention as adopted renders unlawful under customary international law existing stat-
utory provisions such as those in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. . . . The issues remain controversial.”).
41 See Sept. 23 Press Briefing, supra note 27.
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 See White House Press Release, Press Briefing by Press Secretary Josh Earnest (Sept. 27, 2016), at https://
www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/09/27/press-briefing-press-secretary-josh-earnest-92716; White
House Press Release, Press Briefing by Press Secretary Josh Earnest (Oct. 4, 2016), at https://www.whitehouse.
gov/the-press-office/2016/10/04/press-briefing-press-secretary-josh-earnest-1042016; Apr. 18 Press Briefing,
supra note 20.
45 According to media reports, Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.) said that “[i]t appears as if
there may be some unintended ramifications of [JASTA],” and Speaker Paul Ryan (R-Wis.) said “I would like to
think there may be some work to be done to protect our service members overseas from any kind of legal ensnare-
ment that [could] occur . . . while still protecting the rights of the 9/11 victims . . . .” Seung Min Kim & Burgess
Everett, McConnell: Saudi 9/11 Law Could Have “Unintended Ramifications,” POLITICO (Sept. 29, 2016), at
http://www.politico.com/story/2016/09/mitch-mcconnell-saudi-9-11-bill-228903.
46 Letter from Twenty-Eight Senators to John Cornyn, U.S. Senate, and Charles E. Schumer, U.S. Senate
(Sept. 28, 2016), at http://www.corker.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/d8eee900-5ffc-4204-a4f1-
8072c104d9c2/Bipartisan%20Senate%20JASTA%20Letter%20092816.pdf. See also Dara Lind & Dylan
Matthews, 97 Senators Overrode an Obama Veto. Then 28 Sent an “Oops” Letter, VOX (Sept. 28, 2016), at
http://www.vox.com/2016/9/28/13100314/vox-sentences-congress-veto-obama.
47 White House Press Release, Press Briefing by Press Secretary Josh Earnest and Secretary of Education King
(Sept. 29, 2016), at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/09/29/press-briefing-press-secretary-
josh-earnest-and-secretary-education-king.
48 U.S. Dep’t of State, Daily Press Briefing (Oct. 21, 2016), at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2016/10/
263421.htm (“Well, I thinkwhat the Secretarywas referring towas thatwe’re going to continue to speakwithmembers
of Congress about our concerns over the law. Look, you’re right; it’s the law of the land, andwe understand that andwe
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In late 2016, Senators John McCain and Lindsey Graham initiated an effort to amend
JASTA.49 They proposed a “modest” “caveat” to the law, such that
if you are suing based on a discretionary function of a government to form an alliance with some-
body or to make a military decision or a political decision, the only time that government is liable
is if they knowingly engage with a terrorist organization directly or indirectly, including
financing.50
According to Senator Graham, “[t]hat would send a signal to the world that we are not open-
ing Pandora’s box.”51
Despite efforts by both the State Department and White House to work with Congress to
mitigate potential negative consequences of the law,52 no amendment was passed during the
lame-duck session. As Congress’ 2016 session neared its end, Secretary of State John Kerry
said, “[w]e tried very hard to move on changing [JASTA] and we will continue to do that.”53
As a candidate, President-elect Trump had expressed strong support for JASTA, reportedly
describing President Obama’s veto as “one of the low points of his presidency” and saying that
he would have approved the law if he were president.54While advocating for a JASTA amend-
ment, Senators McCain and Graham acknowledged the possibility that the law might not be
“fixed” prior to 2017 and insisted, “[w]e are not going to stop until we have this problem fixed
because it is a real problem for people serving the United States in real time.”55
U.S. Federal Court of Appeals Upholds United Nations’ Immunity in Case Related to Cholera in
Haiti
doi:10.1017/ajil.2016.10
OnOctober 9, 2013, a group of Haitian cholera victims and their survivors sued the United
Nations, along with two UN officials and the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti
(MINUSTAH), in theU.S.District Court for the SouthernDistrict ofNewYork.1 The plaintiffs
alleged that theUnitedNations had negligently and recklessly allowed peacekeepers fromNepal
carrying cholera to enter Haiti in the wake of the 2010 earthquake without reasonable health
screenings.2 The suit further alleged that the United Nations had negligently maintained
obey the law and we will obey this law. There’s no dispute about that. But we still have concerns about it and many of
our partners, some of whom are even in places like Europe, some of our closest allies, have lingering concerns about this.
And so we’re going to continue to engage and discuss the law and its implementation going forward with members of
Congress. But other than that, I don’t have any more specifics to offer.”).
49 See 162 CONG. REC. S6611 (daily ed. Nov. 30, 2016).
50 Id. (Statements of Sens. Graham and McCain).
51 Id. (Statement of Sen. Graham).
52 U.S. Dep’t of State, Daily Press Briefing (Dec. 1, 2016), at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2016/12/
264717.htm; White House Press Release, Press Briefing by Press Secretary Josh Earnest (Dec. 1, 2016), at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/12/01/press-briefing-press-secretary-josh-earnest-1212016.
53 U.S. Dep’t of State, Joint Press Availability with Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir (Dec. 18,
2016), at http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2016/12/265750.htm.
54 Mark Hensch, Trump Slams Obama for ‘Shameful’ 9/11 Bill Veto, THEHILL.COM (Sept. 23, 2016), at http://
thehill.com/blogs/ballot-box/presidential-races/297558-trump-rips-obama-for-shameful-9-11-veto.
55 See 162 CONG. REC. S6611, supra note 49 (Statements of Sens. Graham and McCain).
1 Kristina Daugirdas & JulianMortenson, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating, 108 AJIL 819,
822 (2014).
2 Id. at 822.
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inadequate sanitation facilities.3 Finally, the petitioners alleged that the United Nations’ refusal
to accept responsibility for the outbreak had exacerbated the epidemic.4 According to the
United Nations, by August 2016, nearly 800,000 people had become infected with cholera,
and more than 9,000 had died of cholera.5
The United States submitted a statement of interest to the district court, arguing that the
United Nations and all other defendants were immune from suit under the 1946
Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations (CPIUN).6 Of note,
the CPIUN requires the United Nations to “make provisions for appropriate modes of settle-
ment” of certain categories of disputes.7 Pursuant to that provision, the plaintiffs had previously
filed a petition for compensation with the secretary-general. The United Nations denied the
petition on the grounds that the claims were “not receivable” under the CPIUN because “con-
sideration of these claims would necessarily include a review of political and policy matters.”8
On January 9, 2015, the District Court dismissed the plaintiff’s claims for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction:
The Charter of the United Nations (“UNCharter”) states that the UN “shall enjoy in the territory
of each of its Members such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the fulfillment of its
purposes.” The CPIUN, which was adopted less than a year after the UN Charter, defines the
UN’s privileges and immunities in more detail. The CPIUN provides that “[t]he United
Nations, its property and assets wherever located and by whomsoever held, shall enjoy immunity
from every form of legal process except insofar as in any particular case it has expressly waived its
immunity.” Because the CPIUN is self-executing, this Court must enforce it despite the lack of
implementing legislation from Congress.
The Second Circuit’s decision in Brzak v. United Nations requires that Plaintiffs’ suit against the UN
be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(h)(3). In Brzak, the Second
Circuit unequivocally held that “[a]s the CPIUN makes clear, the United Nations enjoys absolute
immunity from suit unless ‘it has expressly waived its immunity.’” Here, no party contends that
the UN has expressly waived its immunity. Accordingly, under the clear holding of Brzak, the
3 Id.
4 Id. at 823.
5 United Nations, Fact Sheet: Response to Cholera in Haiti, Aug. 2016, at http://www.un.org/News/dh/info-
cus/haiti/CholeraFactsheetAug2016.pdf.
6 Daugirdas & Mortenson, supra note 1, at 823–26.
7 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations Art. VIII, sec. 29, Feb. 13, 1946, 1
UNTS 15 (requiring the United Nations to “make provisions for appropriate modes of settlement” of “[d]isputes
arising out of contracts or other disputes of a private law character to which the United Nations is a party” and “[d]
isputes involving any official of the United Nations who by reason of his official position enjoys immunity, if
immunity has not been waived by the Secretary-General”).
8 Daugirdas & Mortenson, supra note 1, at 822, citing Letter from Patricia O’Brien, UN Under-Secretary-
General for Legal Affairs to Brian Concannon, Attorney for the Haitian Cholera Victims (Feb. 21, 2013), at
http://opiniojuris.org/wp-content/uploads/LettertoMr.BrianConcannon.pdf. The UN secretary-general later
provided a more expansive analysis in a response to inquiries from four UN special rapporteurs. See Letter
from Pedro Medrano, Assistant Secretary-General and Senior Coordinator for Cholera Response, to Leilani
Farha, Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing as a Component of the Right to an Adequate Standard of
Living, and on the Right to Nondiscrimination in this Context; Gustavo Gallón, Independent Expert on the
Situation of Human Rights in Haiti; Dainius Pūras, Special Rapporteur on the Right of Everyone to the
Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental Health; and Catarina de Albuquerque,
Special Rapporteur on the Human Right to Safe Drinking Water and Sanitation, paras. 84–98, (Nov. 25,
2014), at https://spdb.ohchr.org/hrdb/28th/Haiti_ASG_25.11.14_(3.2014).pdf.
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UN is immune from Plaintiffs’ suit. In addition, MINUSTAH, as a subsidiary body of the UN, is also
immune from suit.9
TheDistrict Court also ruled that the immunity of the UnitedNations was not contingent on
the availability of an alternative means of dispute resolution.10 Finally, the court held that the
United Nations officials named in the suit were also immune.11
The plaintiffs appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.12 While the
decision from the three-judge panel was pending, 158 members of Congress signed a bipar-
tisan letter from Michigan representative John Conyers Jr. expressing frustration with the
United Nations’ lack of accountability:13
We write to urge the State Department to immediately and unreservedly exercise its leadership to
ensure that the United Nations (UN) take concrete steps to eliminate the cholera epidemic intro-
duced to Haiti in 2010 by waste from a UN peacekeeper camp, and to comply with its legal and
moral obligations to provide cholera victims with access to an effective remedy.
. . .
While the deaths, illness, and evidence of malfeasance mounted, UN Assistant Secretary-General
Pedro Medrano Rojas, who met with Congress as the UN’s point person for responding to the
epidemic, left office in June 2015 and was not replaced. The UN continues to refuse to even dis-
cuss providing compensation for the losses incurred by those killed and sickened by the cholera it
brought toHaiti, and there is no notable progress in its proclaimed efforts to provide the water and
sanitation infrastructure necessary to control the cholera epidemic.
. . .
While we do not wish to take a position in the litigation, we are deeply concerned that the State
Department’s failure to take more leadership in the diplomatic realm might be perceived by our
constituents and the world as a limited commitment to an accountable and credible UN.14
In response to this letter, a State Department spokesperson praised Representative Conyers’s
leadership and emphasized the United States’ commitment to assisting Haiti in combating
the cholera outbreak, highlighting the $95 million the United States had already spent for
treatment and prevention.15
Additionally, before the Second Circuit ruled, a report criticizing the United Nations’
response to the cholera outbreak by the United Nations special rapporteur on extreme pov-
erty and human rights, Philip Alston, was leaked to the press. An excerpt follows:16
9 Georges v. United Nations, 84 F.Supp.3d 246, 248–49 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (internal citations omitted).
10 Id. at 249–50.
11 Id. at 250.
12 Georges v. United Nations, 834 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2016).
13 Rick Gladstone, Lawmakers Urge John Kerry to Press U.N. for Haiti Cholera Response, N.Y. TIMES (June 29,
2016), at http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/30/world/americas/haiti-cholera-john-kerry-congress.html.
14 Office of Congressman John Conyers, Jr. Press Release, Reps. John Conyers and Mia Love Lead Bipartisan
Group of More Than 150 Members of Congress in Calling for UN to Take Responsibility for Haiti Cholera
Epidemic (June 29, 2016), at https://conyers.house.gov/sites/conyers.house.gov/files/06_29_16%20Kerry%
20Haiti%20Cholera%20Letter%20Final.pdf.
15 U.S. Dep’t of State Press Release, Daily Press Briefing (Aug. 3, 2016), at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/
2016/08/260813.htm.
16 Jonathan M. Katz, U.N. Admits Role in Cholera Epidemic in Haiti, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 17, 2016), at http://
www.nytimes.com/2016/08/18/world/americas/united-nations-haiti-cholera.html.
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The scientific evidence now points overwhelmingly to the responsibility of the peacekeeping mis-
sion as the source of the outbreak. 9,145 persons have so far died and almost 780,000 have been
infected. To date, the United Nations has denied responsibility for the outbreak, rejected all
claims for compensation, refused to establish any procedure to resolve the resulting disputes,
and has relied on a claim of absolute immunity in defending litigation brought by victims.
This policy of abdicating responsibility relies on a claim of scientific uncertainty that is no longer
sustainable and an unpublished legal opinion that the resulting claims are not “of a private law
nature” and are thus not receivable. Based on what is known of the legal analysis, it is deeply
flawed.
The UN’s policy is morally unconscionable, legally indefensible, and politically self-defeating. It is
also entirely unnecessary. In practice, it jeopardizes the UN’s immunity by encouraging argu-
ments calling for it to be reconsidered by national courts; it upholds a double standard according
to which the UN insists that Member States respect human rights, while rejecting any such
responsibility for itself; it leaves the UN vulnerable to eventual claims for damages and compen-
sation in this and subsequent cases which are highly unlikely to be settled on terms that are man-
ageable from the UN’s perspective; it provides highly combustible fuel for those who claim that
UN peace-keeping operations trample on the rights of those being protected; and it undermines
both the UN’s credibility and the integrity of the Office of the Secretary-General.17
Shortly after the report was sent to UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, a deputy spokes-
person for the secretary-general indicated that the United Nations planned to change its
approach to the cholera outbreak in Haiti while maintaining its immunity from the lawsuit
filed in New York.18 According to an email written by the spokesperson, “over the past year,
the U.N. has become convinced that it needs to domuchmore regarding its own involvement
in the initial outbreak and the suffering of those affected by cholera.”19 The spokesperson also
indicated that a “new response will be presented publicly within the next two months, once it
has been fully elaborated, agreed with the Haitian authorities and discussed with member
states.”20
The following day, the Second Circuit upheld the district court’s ruling.21 The Second
Circuit rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the United Nations’ immunity was contingent
on its provision of an alternative dispute settlement mechanism:
Here, application of two particular “principles which govern the interpretation of contracts” dem-
onstrates why plaintiffs’ first argument is unavailing. The first such principle is expressio unius est
exclusio alterius—“express mention of one thing excludes all others”—which is also known as the
negative-implication canon. This principle has guided federal courts’ interpretations of treaties for
over a century.
As noted above, Section 2 of the CPIUN provides that the UN “shall enjoy immunity from every
form of legal process except insofar as in any particular case it has expressly waived its immunity.”
Especially when coupled with the compulsory “shall”—which “is universally understood to
17 Philip Alston’s Draft Report on the U.N. and the Haiti Cholera Outbreak, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 19, 2016), at http://
www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/08/19/magazine/document-Alston-Haiti-Cholera-Report.html. For the
final published version of the report, see Philip Alston (Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human
Rights), Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights in Accordance with Human
Rights Council Res. 26/3, UN Doc. A/71/40823 (Aug. 26, 2016).
18 Katz, supra note 16.
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Georges, 834 F.3d 88; see also Jonathan M. Katz, U.S. Court Upholds United Nations’ Immunity in Cholera
Suit, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 18, 2016), at http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/19/world/americas/united-nations-chol-
era-haiti.html.
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indicate an imperative or mandate”—Section 2’s “express mention of” the UN’s express waiver as
a circumstance in which the UN “shall [not] enjoy immunity” negatively implies that “all other[]”
circumstances, including the UN’s failure to fulfill its Section 29 obligation, are “exclude[d].” It
necessarily follows that the UN’s fulfillment of its Section 29 obligation is not a condition prece-
dent to its Section 2 immunity.
This conclusion is buttressed by the second principle of contract interpretation relevant to our
analysis—that “conditions precedent to most contractual obligations . . . are not favored and
must be expressed in plain, unambiguous language.”Tomanifest their intent to create a condition
precedent, “[p]arties often use language such as ‘if,’ ‘on condition that,’ ‘provided that,’ ‘in the
event that,’ and ‘subject to.’”No such language links Sections 2 and 29 in the CPIUN. Of course,
“specific talismanic words are not required.” But “there is [also] no . . . [other] language [in the
CPIUN] which, even straining, we could read as imposing” the UN’s fulfillment of its Section 29
obligation as a condition precedent to its Section 2 immunity.22
The court then dismissed the material breach argument in light of its conclusion that the
plaintiffs lacked standing to make that claim:
Plaintiffs next argue that “[t]he District Court’s finding of immunity was erroneous . . . because
Section 29 is a material term to the CPIUN as a whole.” According to plaintiffs, the UN’s material
breach of its Section 29 obligation means that it “is no longer entitled to the performance of duties
owed to it under” the CPIUN, including its Section 2 immunity. We need not reach the merits of
this argument, however, because plaintiffs lack standing to raise it.
As we have recently reiterated, “absent protest or objection by the offended sovereign, [an indi-
vidual] has no standing to raise the violation of international law as an issue.” The plaintiffs have
not identified any sovereign that has objected to the UN’s alleged material breach. To the con-
trary, the United States has asked us to affirm the District Court’s judgment, and no other country
has expressed an interest in this litigation.23
Finally, the Court found that the plaintiffs’ arguments for right of access “[failed] to
convince”:24
As we stated in Brzak v. United Nations, in which we rejected a virtually indistinguishable chal-
lenge to an application of Section 2 of the CPIUN, plaintiffs’ argument does little more “than ques-
tion why immunities in general should exist.” But “legislatively and judicially crafted immunities
of one sort or another have existed since well before the framing of the Constitution, have been
extended and modified over time, and are firmly embedded in American law.” Plaintiffs’ argu-
ment, if correct, would seem to defeat not only the UN’s immunity, but also “judicial immunity,
prosecutorial immunity, and legislative immunity.” Plaintiffs do not persuasively differentiate the
quotidian and constitutionally permissible application of these doctrines from application of
Section 2 of the CPIUN here.25
On August 19, 2016, the Office of the United Nations Secretary-General issued a state-
ment in response to the Second Circuit’s ruling:
The Secretary-General deeply regrets the terrible suffering the people of Haiti have endured as a
result of the cholera epidemic. The United Nations has a moral responsibility to the victims of the
cholera epidemic and for supporting Haiti in overcoming the epidemic and building sound water,
sanitation and health systems.
. . .
22 Georges, 834 F.3d at 93–94 (internal citations omitted).
23 Id. at 97 (internal citations omitted).
24 Id. at 98.
25 Id. (internal citations omitted).
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The Secretary-General is actively working to develop a package that would provide material assis-
tance and support to those Haitians most directly affected by cholera. These efforts must include,
as a central focus, the victims of the disease and their families. The United Nations also intends to
intensify its support to reduce, and ultimately end, the transmission of cholera, improve access to
care and treatment and address the longer-term issues of water, sanitation and health systems in
Haiti.26
In the months following the Second Circuit decision, the United Nations has provided
some further information about its planned compensation plan.27 The plan has two tracks:
the first track aims to combat the cholera epidemic itself (by, for example, addressing the
water infrastructure still needing repair from the 2010 earthquake);28 “the second track
aims to develop a framework proposal to Member States for material assistance to those
Haitians most affected by cholera after the 2010 outbreak.”29
Apart from its filings in the lawsuit against the United States, the Obama administration
had been largely silent about the United Nations’ response to cholera in Haiti.30
Nevertheless, in a statement before a committee of the UN General Assembly, Alston sug-
gested that the United States had played an influential role in shaping the United Nations’
legal position:
[I]t seems relevant to note that the United States of America, which has a strong interest in this
issue both as a close neighbor of Haiti and as the principal contributor to the UN’s peacekeeping
budget, has itself never publicly stated its legal position on this issue, despite many requests that it
do so. There is reason to believe that the position adopted by [the UN Office of Legal Affairs] in
2013 was consistent with views strongly pressed at the time by the United States. The reasoning
behind the US position seems to be that the UN must follow American legal practice which gen-
erally takes the view that legal responsibility should never be accepted when it can possibly be
avoided, because one never knows the consequences for subsequent litigation.31
At a press conference two days later, State Department Spokesperson John Kirby was asked
about the United States’ role in shaping the United Nations’ legal position:
QUESTION: . . . [E]arlier this week, there was a UN expert speaking up at the UN in
New York about Haiti and the cholera epidemic. And in his comments,
he . . . hinted . . . that the reason the UN took the position that it took
when people tried to get some accountability for the introduction of
26 Secretary-General Press Statement, Statement Attributable to the Spokesman for the Secretary General on
Haiti (Aug. 19, 2016), at https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2016-08-19/statement-attributable-
spokesman-secretary-general-haiti.
27 UN Deputy Chief Briefs Member States on New UN Approaches to Cholera Outbreak in Haiti, UN NEWS
CENTRE (Oct. 14, 2016), at http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=55307#.WBQdLHiCwUV.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Samantha Power, the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, has not publicly commented on the United
Nations’ role in the cholera crisis in Haiti. In March 2014, she posted a comment on Twitter: “More needed to
combat cholera: Countries need to expand support for #Haiti’s efforts to treat those with cholera & improve san-
itation.” See Samantha Power (@Ambassador Power), TWITTER (Mar. 24, 2014), at https://twitter.com/
AmbassadorPower/status/448238784916643840.
31 Statement by Professor Philip Alston, Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights, UN
Responsibility for the Introduction of Cholera into Haiti, 71st Sess. of the General Assembly, Third
Committee, Item 68 (b&c) (Oct. 25, 2016), at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.
aspx?NewsID=20794&LangID=E.
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cholera intoHaiti was at the behest of the United States. Can you address
that? Is that correct? Did you pressure or push the UN into not
responding?
MR KIRBY: No, we did not. We have been very clear that we do not take a position
on the validity of the underlying claims in this particular case. We do not
take a position.
QUESTION: But you did take a position in favor of the United Nations, correct?
MR KIRBY: What we’ve said is we support efforts by the special rapporteur to give
greater prominence to the plight of those living in extreme poverty. We
have said before that we welcomed the secretary-general’s acceptance of
the UN’s moral responsibility for the cholera outbreak and his recent
statement expressing regret for the loss of life. We’ve also said that we
recognize more must be done and we support the UN’s ongoing efforts
to design an assistance package to assist those most affected by cholera
including in the wake of Hurricane Matthew. So we look forward to
receiving the secretary-general’s proposal for the provision of a package
of assistance and support to Haitians most affected by the cholera.. . .
QUESTION: . . . I think Matt’s fundamental question was: Did the U.S. Government
at any time discourage the UN from taking responsibility, right? Was
that fundamentally your question?. . .
MR KIRBY: I’m not aware that we discouraged them from taking responsibility. I
said . . . we welcomed that—. . .
MR KIRBY: —the secretary-general said it was a moral responsibility.32 But with
respect to the actual claims, we did not take a position on the validity
of the underlying claims in this case.
QUESTION: . . . [C]ouldn’t you discourage them from taking responsibility even if
you don’t take a position on the underlying claims? Look, you could
say, “Look, I don’t know who did this, but it’s going to be bad if you
take responsibility, so don’t do that.”
MR KIRBY: Well, I mean, could we have? I don’t know. I suppose we could have. I’m
not aware that we did.What I can tell you is we did not take a position on
the underlying claims and we did welcome the secretary-general’s actions
and his comments on this matter going forward.33
On December 1, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon spoke about the United Nations’ new
approach to cholera in Haiti:
The United Nations deeply regrets the loss of life and suffering caused by the cholera outbreak in
Haiti. On behalf of the United Nations, I want to say very clearly: we apologise to the Haitian
people. We simply did not do enough with regard to the cholera outbreak and its spread in Haiti.
32 [Editors’ note: In July 2014, the secretary-general stated his belief that “the international community, includ-
ing the United Nations, has a moral responsibility to help the Haitian people stem the further spread of the cholera
epidemic.” He did not address the legal implications of this statement. Daugirdas & Mortenson, supra note 1, at
826.]
33 U.S. Dep’t of State Press Release, Daily Press Briefing (Oct. 27, 2016), at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/
2016/10/263730.htm#HAITI.
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We are profoundly sorry for our role.
. . .
Our new approach to Haiti and cholera is founded on and follows two tracks. The assistance
requested amounts to around $400 million over two years divided between Track One and
Track Two.
Track One consists of a substantially intensified effort to respond to, and reduce, the incidence of
cholera in Haiti. Haitians clearly have told us that eliminating cholera must be priority number
one. We would like to see improvements in people’s access to care and treatment when sick, while
also addressing the longer-term issues of water, sanitation and health systems.
Work on Track One is [well] under way. . . .
. . .
. . . [O]ur new approach includes a second track—Track 2—that focuses specifically on those
Haitians most directly affected by cholera, their families and communities. . . . Track Two is a
concrete expression of the regret of our Organization for the suffering so many Haitians have
endured. On that basis, we propose to take a community approach that would provide a package
of material assistance and support to those most severely impacted by cholera. The support would
be based on priorities established in consultation with communities, victims and their families.
. . .
This support could take many forms, including projects to alleviate the impacts of cholera and
strengthen capacity to address the conditions that increase cholera risk. It could also include pro-
jects reflecting community needs not directly related to cholera, such as education grants, micro-
finance or other initiatives.
. . .
Some have urged that the package also include an individual component, such as the payment of
money to the families of those who died of cholera. This approach would require identification of
the deceased individuals and their family members. It would also require the certainty of sufficient
funding to provide a meaningful fixed amount per cholera death.
We need to do further on-the-ground consultations, while acknowledging the difficulties
involved. Additional evaluation is needed on whether and how the limitations of information
on deaths from cholera, including the identities of the victims, can be addressed and on the chal-
lenges and costs associated with that effort.34
Ban emphasized the need for adequate funding, and encouraged member states to contribute
voluntary funds to the newly established United Nations Haiti Cholera Response Multi-
Partner Trust Fund.35
Ambassador Isobel Coleman, the U.S. Representative to the United Nations for UN
Management and Reform, delivered informal remarks in response. An excerpt follows:
As the Secretary-General has movingly noted, cholera has had a devastating effect on the Haitian
people since it was introduced in Haiti in 2010. Families have lost loved ones, caregivers, and
breadwinners. No community has been untouched. There is a clear humanitarian imperative
to respond to the epidemic in a robust and sustained manner.
34 UN Secretary-General, Secretary-General’s Remarks to theGeneral Assembly on aNewApproach to Address
Cholera in Haiti (Dec. 1, 2016), at https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2016-12-01/secretary-gener-
als-remarks-general-assembly-new-approach-address; see alsoUN Secretary-General, A New Approach to Cholera
in Haiti, U.N. Doc. A/71/620 (Nov. 25, 2016).
35 Id.
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. . .
There is also a clear ethical duty to respond to the cholera epidemic in Haiti. Not a single one of
these cases should have occurred. For this reason, the United States welcomes the Secretary-
General’s acceptance of the UN’s moral responsibility for the cholera outbreak and his statement
last month in Haiti expressing regret for the resulting loss of life. While the UN and the interna-
tional community have made strides in containing and preventing the further spread of the dis-
ease, the U.S. recognizes that more must be done and supports the UN’s ongoing efforts to design
an assistance package for those most affected by cholera.
. . .
We welcome the Secretary-General’s apology today and the proposed new approach as meaning-
ful symbols of atonement to the Haitian people, and important steps in restoring the credibility of
the UnitedNations. And we look forward to working with the Secretary-General and his successor
to ensure that this initiative has a positive and lasting impact for those most affected.36
USE OF FORCE AND ARMS CONTROL
U.S.-Russian Agreements on Syria Break Down as the Syrian Conflict Continues
doi:10.1017/ajil.2016.5
Starting in February 2016, the United States and Russia reached a series of agreements
aimed at establishing a cessation of hostilities in the Syrian civil war and facilitating a political
settlement of the underlying conflict. Although the agreements showed initial promise, var-
ious breakdowns led the United States to suspend bilateral communications with Russia
regarding maintenance of the agreements by October 2016.
The United States and Russia have each used armed force during the civil war, mostly by
conducting air strikes. Since September 2014, theUnited States has directed air strikes against
Syrian positions of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).1 Russia’s air strikes began
one year later at the request of Syria’s president, Bashar al Assad.2 Russia justified its air strikes
as targeting terrorist groups and “actively promot[ing] the political process” of settling the
conflict.3 While Russia’s assistance has facilitated the Assad regime’s expansion of territorial
control, opposition groups continue to occupy large portions of the country.4
In October 2015, the United States and Russia convened meetings among a
group of nations to discuss a potential ceasefire and political resolution to the Syrian
36 United Nations, Ambassador Isobel Coleman, U.S. Representative to the UN for UN Management and
Reform, U.S. Mission to the United Nations, Remarks at an Informal Briefing by the Secretary-General on
the United Nations’ New Approach to Cholera in Haiti (Dec. 1, 2016), at https://usun.state.gov/remarks/7582.
1 Kristina Daugirdas & Julian Davis Mortenson, Contemporary Practice of the United States, 109 AJIL 199,
203 (2015).
2 SeeMinistry of Defence of the Russ. Fed’n Press Release, Russian Aviation Performed High-Accuracy Strikes
Against International Terror Organization ISIS (Sept. 30, 2016), at http://eng.mil.ru/en/news_page/country/
more.htm?id=12059172@egNews; see also Ministry of Foreign Aff. of the Russ. Fed’n Press Release, Foreign
Minister Sergey Lavrov’s Remarks and Answers to Media Questions Following a Meeting with US Secretary of
State John Kerry, New York, September 30, 2015 (Oct. 1, 2015), at http://www.mid.ru/en/web/guest/foreign_
policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/1819477 [hereinafter Sergey Lavrov’s Remarks].
3 See Sergey Lavrov’s Remarks, supra note 2.
4 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence
Community 17–18, 22–23 (Feb. 9, 2016), at https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/
SASC_Unclassified_2016_ATA_SFR_FINAL.pdf.
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conflict.5 Eventually, this group grew to include seventeen nations and representatives of the
Arab League, the European Union, and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation.6 The
United States and Russia formally co-chair the group, which is now called the
International Syria Support Group (ISSG).7
On February 22, 2016, the United States and Russia, as co-chairs of the ISSG, agreed to a
Cessation of Hostilities (COH),8 an international instrument directed at three goals: (1) lim-
iting hostilities between the Syrian government and opposition groups; (2) permitting
humanitarian aid to reach civilians; and (3) advancing a political settlement to the conflict.9
While ISIL and the Al Qaeda affiliated group al-Nusra10 were precluded from joining the
agreement, the instrument invited all other opposition groups as well as the Armed Forces
of the Syrian Arab Republic (Syrian Army) to agree to its terms.11
The precise legal status of the instrument was at least initially ambiguous. At a press brief-
ing to announce the undertaking, a State Department spokesperson stated that “it’s
incumbent on [signatories] to live up to the obligations and to buy into the cessation of hos-
tilities.”12 Subsequent statements have indicated a political agreement. The day after he
announced the conclusion of the agreement, Secretary of State John Kerry referred to the
COH as “this proposed arrangement,”13 and subsequent iterations have been described by
the StateDepartment as “an arrangement, in the formof understandings.”14 Russian descriptions
of the agreement have emphasized its importance, but have not labeled the COH a treaty.15
5 U.S. Dep’t of State Press Release, Joint Press Availability with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and
UN Special Envoy Steffan de Mistura (Oct. 30, 2015), at https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2015/
10/249019.htm.
6 U.S. Dep’t of State Press Release, Statement of the International Syria Support Group (Feb. 11, 2016), at
https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2016/02/252428.htm.
7 Id.
8 U.S. Dep’t of State Press Release, Joint Statement of the United States and the Russian Federation, as Co-
Chairs of the ISSG, on Cessation of Hostilities in Syria (Feb. 22, 2016), at https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/
ps/2016/02/253115.htm [hereinafter U.S.-Russia Joint Statement on COH].
9 See id.
10 Daugirdas & Mortenson, supra note 1, at 209. In July 2016, al-Nusra’s leader announced that the group
would henceforth call itself “Jabhat Fath al Sham.” See U.S. Dep’t of State Press Release, State Department
Amendments to the Terrorist Designation of al-Nusrah Front (Nov. 10, 2016), at https://2009-2017.state.
gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2016/11/264230.htm.
11 U.S.-Russia Joint Statement on COH, supra note 8. (“The nationwide cessation of hostilities is to apply to
any party currently engaged in military or paramilitary hostilities against any other parties other than ‘Daesh,’
‘Jabhat al-Nusra,’ or other terrorist organizations designated by the UN Security Council.”).
12 U.S. Dep’t of State Press Release, Daily Press Briefing (Feb. 22, 2016), at https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/
prs/dpb/2016/02/253123.htm.
13 U.S. Dep’t of State Press Release, Remarks with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi (Feb. 23, 2016), at
https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2016/02/253164.htm.
14 U.S. Dep’t of State, Fact Sheet on U.S.-Russia Arrangement on Reducing Violence in Syria (Sept. 9, 2016)
[hereinafter U.S.-Russia Arrangement Fact Sheet].
15 See, e.g., Ministry of Foreign Aff. of the Russ. Fed’n Press Release, ForeignMinister Sergey Lavrov’s Remarks
at the UN Security Council High-Level Briefing on the Situation in the Middle East and North Africa (Sept. 21,
2016), at http://www.mid.ru/en/web/guest/general_assembly/-/asset_publisher/lrzZMhfoyRUj/content/id/
2458378 (“Russia and the United States as the ISSG co-chairs worked for over six months to coordinate concrete
agreements”); id (referring to coalition air strikes as a “blatant violation of the cessation of hostilities regime”); Pres.
of Russia Press Release, Readout of Telephone Conversation with Federal Chancellor of Germany Angela Merkel
(Sept. 29, 2016), at http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/52990 (“The President of Russia again stressed
how important it is for the United States to fulfil its promises to ensure the separation of the so-called moderate
opposition from terrorist groups.”).
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As a matter of substance, the COH committed all signatories to accept parallel “responsibil-
ities,”mutatis mutandis. It listed “[t]he responsibilities of the Syrian armed opposition” as follows:
1. To take part in the cessation of hostilities, armed opposition groups will confirm
—to the United States of America or the Russian Federation, who will attest such
confirmations to one another as co-chairs of the ISSG by no later than 12:00
(Damascus time) on February 26, 2016—their commitment to and acceptance
of the following terms:
• To full implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 2254,16 adopted
unanimously on December 18, 2015,—including the readiness to participate
in the UN-facilitated political negotiation process;
• To cease attacks with any weapons, including rockets, mortars, and anti-tank
guided missiles, against Armed Forces of the Syrian Arab Republic, and any
associated forces;
• To refrain from acquiring or seeking to acquire territory from other parties to
the ceasefire;
• To allow humanitarian agencies[] rapid, safe, unhindered and sustained access
throughout areas under their operational control and allow immediate
humanitarian assistance to reach all people in need;
• To proportionate use of force (i.e., no greater than required to address an
immediate threat) if and when responding in self-defense.17
In a separate paragraph, the COH then stated that signatory opposition groups would
“observe[]” the abovementioned commitments, provided that “the Armed Forces of the
Syrian Arab Republic, and all forces supporting or associated with the Armed Forces of the
Syrian Arab Republic” also undertook a parallel set of “responsibilities”:18
2. The above-mentioned commitments will be observed by such armed opposition
groups, provided that the Armed Forces of the Syrian Arab Republic, and all
forces supporting or associated with the Armed Forces of the Syrian Arab
Republic have confirmed to the Russian Federation as co-chair of the ISSG by
no later than 12:00 (Damascus time) on February 26, 2016[,] their commitment
to and acceptance of the following terms:
• To full implementation of UN Security Resolution 2254, adopted unani-
mously on December 18, 2015, including the readiness to participate in
the UN-facilitated political negotiation process;
• To cease attacks with any weapons, including aerial bombardments by the Air
Force of the Syrian Arab Republic and the Aerospace Forces of the Russian
Federation, against the armed opposition groups (as confirmed to the
United States or the Russian Federation by parties to the cessation of
hostilities);
16 S.C. Res. 2254 (Dec. 18, 2015). Resolution 2254 asked the secretary-general to “convene representatives of
the Syrian government and the opposition to engage in formal negotiations on a political transition process on an
urgent basis.” Id., para. 2. The Resolution also demands “that all parties immediately comply with their obligations
under international law” and “[c]alls on the parties to immediately allow humanitarian agencies rapid, safe and
unhindered access throughout Syria by most direct routes, [and to] allow immediate, humanitarian assistance to
reach all people in need, in particular in all besieged and hard-to-reach areas.” Id., paras. 12–13.
17 U.S.-Russia Joint Statement on COH, supra note 8.
18 Id.
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• To refrain from acquiring or seeking to acquire territory from other parties to
the ceasefire;
• To allow humanitarian agencies[] rapid, unhindered and sustained access
throughout areas under their operational control and allow immediate
humanitarian assistance to reach all people in need;
• To proportionate use of force (i.e., no greater than required to address an
immediate threat) if and when responding in self-defense.
The United States and Russia established a communications hotline to prevent hostilities
between the parties to the COH, and a Ceasefire Task Force was tasked with delineating
the territory held by various groups and resolving allegations of noncompliance.19
At first, the COH succeeded in diminishing hostilities between the Syrian Army and oppo-
sition groups. In February and March 2016, United States officials repeatedly praised the
COH. Secretary Kerry stated that the COH had led to an “80 to 90 percent reduction in
the level of violence.”20 Moreover, Kerry recognized that the deal had permitted
the delivery of emergency supplies to communities inside Syria . . . some of which had not seen
assistance in years. More than 300 trucks have now provided aid to least 150,000 people—about
one third of the almost half of a million people who are living in absolutely besieged or hard-to-
reach areas.21
Nonetheless, the United States acknowledged that there were ongoing violations of the agree-
ment. For example, Kerry accused the Assad regime of stealing humanitarian supplies and
carrying out “[a]erial bombardments” against parties to the COH.”22
The United States and Russia attempted to bolster the COHwith a follow-up agreement in
March 2016.23 The agreement established a standard operating procedure for the United States
and Russia tomonitor alleged violations of the COH.24 Specifically, the agreement required the
United States and Russia to exchange information concerning alleged breaches and required all
parties to the COH to prioritize peaceful means of resolving disputes.25 In addition, during a
visit by Secretary Kerry toMoscow inMarch 2016, the United States and Russia agreed to bol-
ster their humanitarian efforts under the COH. According to Secretary Kerry,
We agreed today that the United States and Russia would push for expanded humanitarian access
in order to reach all parts of Syria, while at the same time preventing any party from interfering
19 Id. The United Nations Security Council endorsed the COH in Resolution 2268. S.C. Res. 2268 (Feb. 26,
2016). The resolution called on the parties to the COH to comply with international law, reduce hostilities, permit
access to humanitarian aid, and engage in political negotiations for a final settlement. Id., paras. 5–8. See also
Samantha Power, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Explanation of Vote at the Adoption of UN
Security Council Resolution 2268 on the Cessation of Hostilities in Syria, Remarks Following UN Security
Council Vote (Feb. 26, 2016), at https://2009-2017-usun.state.gov/remarks/7156.
20 U.S. Dep’t of State Press Release, Joint Press Availability with French Foreign Minister Jean-Marc Ayrault,
German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier, British Foreign Secretary Philip Hammond, EU High
Representative Federica Mogherini, and Italian Foreign Minister Paolo Gentiloni (Mar. 13, 2016), at https://
2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2016/03/254644.htm.
21 Id.
22 Id.; see also U.S. Dep’t of State Press Release, Adherence to the Cessation of Hostilities (Mar. 11, 2016), at
https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2016/03/254633.htm.
23 U.S. Dep’t of State, March 26 – U.S.-Russia Standard Operating Procedures to Support the Cessation of
Hostilities (Sept. 9, 2016), at https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/262413.pdf.
24 Id.
25 Id.
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with the deliveries of essential supplies. We agreed that the regime and the opposition need to
begin releasing detainees, and they need to begin as soon as possible starting with those who
are the most vulnerable. We agreed on a target schedule for establishing a framework for a political
transition and also a draft constitution,26 both of which we target by August.27
After approximately onemonth of reduced hostilities, Russia and Syria announced an April
offensive against rebels in Aleppo. U.S. Ambassador Samantha Power raised concerns that
attacking Aleppo would undermine the COH:
And on the cessation of hostilities, we’re very alarmed by the Syrian prime minister’s public
announcement that he and the Russian Federation are going to launch an offensive around
Aleppo—that would be devastating for the people of Aleppo of course, but also to this intricate
process where the cessation of hostilities, humanitarian access, and political negotiations are all
related to one another.28
After Russia and Syria began their offensive in Aleppo, U.S. officials stated that the campaign
was inconsistent with the COH. On April 28, 2016, the United States condemned an attack
against the al-Quds hospital in Aleppo, which the United States claimed “killed dozens of peo-
ple, including children, patients, and medical personnel.”29 Following the attack, Kerry stated:
The United Nations today assessed the situation in Aleppo to be catastrophic, and the regime’s
most recent offensive actions there—despite the cessation of hostilities—compound the violence
and undermine the cessation of hostilities. Russia has an urgent responsibility to press the regime
to fulfill its commitments under UNSCR 2254, including in particular to stop attacking civilians,
medical facilities, and first responders, and to abide fully by the cessation of hostilities.30
In addition to condemning the offensive in Aleppo, U.S. officials continued to raise concerns
that the Assad regime was interfering with the delivery of humanitarian aid. Ambassador Power
stated that in March the Assad regime confiscated at least 4.5 metric tons of humanitarian aid
from UN convoys.31 Moreover, Power stated that because of “deliberate obstruction by the
Syrian regime,” the United Nations in 2016 had “been permitted to reach just 249,000 people
. . . out of 4.1 million—or a little more than six percent of those in hard to reach areas.”32
26 In November 2015, the ISSG called on Syria to establish “credible, inclusive and non-sectarian governance”
and “[f]ree and fair elections . . . pursuant to [a] new constitution . . . .”U.S. Dep’t of State Press Release, Statement
of the International Syria Support Group (Nov. 14, 2015), at https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2015/11/
249511.htm. The ISSG additionally stated that the UnitedNations should supervise new elections consistent with
“the highest international standards of transparency and accountability, with all Syrians, including the diaspora,
eligible to participate.” Id. The ISSG echoed the Geneva Communiqué of 2012, which also called for a new con-
stitution and inclusive government. Action Group for Syria Final Communiqué (June 30, 2012), at http://www.
un.org/News/dh/infocus/Syria/FinalCommuniqueActionGroupforSyria.pdf.
27 U.S. Dep’t of State Press Release, Remarks with Russian ForeignMinister Sergey Lavrov (Mar. 24, 2016), at
https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2016/03/255138.htm.
28 Samantha Power, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Remarks Following UN Security Council
Consultations on Syria (Apr. 12, 2016), at https://2009-2017-usun.state.gov/remarks/7220 [hereinafter Power
Remarks April 12].
29 U.S. Dep’t of State Press Release, Attack on al-Quds Hospital in Aleppo, Syria (Apr. 28, 2016), at https://
2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2016/04/256697.htm.
30 Id.
31 Power Remarks April 12, supra note 28.
32 Samantha Power, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Remarks at a UN Security Council Open Debate
on the Middle East (Apr. 18, 2016), at https://2009-2017-usun.state.gov/remarks/7231.
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The United States and Russia pursued several diplomatic efforts in May 2016 to repair the
COH. On May 4, 2016, the United States and Russia agreed to specify explicitly that the
agreement applied to Aleppo.33 The State Department announced in a press release that:
We expect all parties to the Cessation of Hostilities to abide fully by the renewed cessation in
Aleppo and throughout the entire country, pursuant to the terms of the arrangements established
in Munich in February 2016. Attacks directed against Syria’s civilian population can never be
justified, and these must stop immediately.34
Moreover, onMay 9, 2016, the United States and Russia reaffirmed their commitment to the
COH and agreed to take several steps to reduce hostilities, enhance humanitarian assistance,
and pursue a political settlement.35 According to the agreement, Russia agreed to “work with
the Syrian authorities to minimize aviation operations over areas that are predominantly
inhabited by civilians or parties to the cessation.”36 Moreover, the United States and
Russia “reaffirm[ed] that all parties must allow immediate and sustained humanitarian access
to reach all people in need, throughout Syria, particularly in all besieged and hard-to-reach
areas, in accordance with UNSCR 2254.”37
Despite renewed diplomacy between the United States and Russia, violence in Syria wors-
ened during the summer of 2016. In June 2016, Assad spoke before the Syrian parliament
and stated that the Syrian Army would escalate its offensive in Aleppo to combat terrorist
groups and to counter alleged interventions by Turkey.38 Shortly thereafter, Russia
announced that it would contribute air support for Syria’s offensive in Aleppo and defended
Assad’s claim that the campaign would target terrorists. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey
Lavrov stated that “[w]hat is now happening in Aleppo and around it—we warned the
Americans about this in advance,” and “[t]he U.S. knows that we will be providing air support
to the Syrian army to prevent territories from being seized by terrorists.”39 Moreover, Lavrov
stated that he informed Kerry that the United States “defaulted on its obligation to separate
the opposition groups loyal to it from Jabhat al-Nusra” and that the United States had failed
to comply with its promise “to prevent infiltrations of militants and weapons fromTurkey.”40
As Russia and Syria continued their campaign in Aleppo, the United States and Russia
reached an arrangement on July 15, 2016, to shore up the COH and to coordinate attacks
against ISIL.41 The parties stated that the agreement was
33 U.S. Dep’t of State Press Release, Reaffirming the Cessation of Hostilities in Aleppo, Syria (May 4, 2016), at
https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2016/05/256865.htm.
34 Id.
35 U.S. Dep’t of State Press Release, Joint Statement of the Russian Federation and the United States on Syria
(May 9, 2016), at https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2016/05/256998.htm.
36 Id.
37 Id. Resolution 2254 “[c]alls on the parties to immediately allow humanitarian agencies rapid, safe and unhin-
dered access throughout Syria bymost direct routes, [and to] allow immediate, humanitarian assistance to reach all
people in need, in particular in all besieged and hard-to-reach areas . . . .” S.C. Res. 2254, supra note 16, para. 12.
38 President Assad’s Parliament Speech (June 7, 2016), at http://www.presidentassad.net/index.php?option=-
com_content&view=article&id=1529:president-assad-s-parliament-speech-june-7-
2016&catid=323&Itemid=496.
39 Russia to Provide Active Support for Syrian Army to Prevent Terrorists from Seizing Aleppo, TASS RUSS. NEWS
AGENCY (June 6, 2016), at http://tass.com/defense/880324.
40 Id.
41 U.S. Dep’t of State Press Release, Joint Press Availability with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov (July
15, 2016), at https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2016/07/260134.htm [hereinafter Kerry Lavrov
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designed to promote a political settlement of the Syrian conflict, and to allow Russia and the U.S.
to work together to bring about the destruction of Nusra and Daesh . . . in the context of a
strengthened COH with all COH parties adhering to COH terms.42
In a press conference with Foreign Minister Lavrov announcing the deal, Secretary Kerry
stated:
[T]he Assad regime has relentlessly continued indiscriminate attacks contrary to the agreements of
the ISSG and the UN Security Council. But on the other side, the terrorist group Jabhat al-Nusra,
the al-Qaida branch in Syria, has also launched its own offensives, sometimes with members of
different oppositions joining with them.
And the result has been a cycle of excuses for continuing to fight each other, with a steady dete-
rioration of a hard-fought-for cessation of hostilities in the process. And that has resulted in the
killing of civilians, more refugees, more displaced persons, more radicalization, more terrorism,
and ultimately an increasing sense of hopelessness among the people of Syria.”43
The agreement called for the United States and Russia to establish a Joint Implementation
Center to “[s]hare intelligence and develop actionable targets for military action against Nusra
in designated areas.”44 The agreement stated that Syria would halt air missions in certain areas
as the United States and Russia carried out coordinated attacks against ISIL and al-Nusra.45
Despite the July 2016 agreement between the United States and Russia, violence in Aleppo
continued to worsen throughout July and August. Russian and Syrian forces concentrated
their attacks on eastern Aleppo where the rebel forces maintained control.46 U.S. officials
again argued that the Russian and Syrian offensive violated the COH. In a UN Security
Council briefing on Syria, Ambassador Power criticized the Russian and Syrian offensive
in Aleppo and stated that their actions had severely limited the delivery of humanitarian aid:
Eastern Aleppo is quickly falling victim to the Assad regime’s typical pattern of starve and surren-
der tactics. Over the last month, the Assad regime flagrantly violated the cessation of hostilities by
attacking Aleppo. The regime and its supporters have cut off Castello Road, the only remaining
supply route for more than 250,000 Syrians living in the eastern part of the city, severing their
access to food, fuel, medicine, clean water, and other essential supplies. . . . [A]lternative options
for delivering humanitarian aid are diminishing rapidly; airstrikes by the Assad regime and by
Russia are making the use of other roads totally precarious.47
Ambassador Power held Russia responsible for the deterioration of the COH and for the
worsening humanitarian crisis. According to Power, “Russia, as a co-sponsor of the cessation
of hostilities, must halt these attacks and persuade the regime to do the same. And they must
ensure the reopening of the Castello Road.”48 To improve the humanitarian crisis, Power
Press Availability July 15]; U.S. Dep’t of State, July 15 – Approach for Practical Russian-American Efforts Against
Daesh and Jabhat al-Nusra and Strengthening the Cessation of Hostilities (Sept. 9, 2016), at https://2009-2017.
state.gov/documents/organization/262413.pdf [hereinafter July 15 U.S.-Russia Agreement]; see also U.S.-Russia
Arrangement Fact Sheet, supra note 14.
42 July 15 U.S.-Russia Agreement, supra note 41.
43 Kerry Lavrov Press Availability July 15, supra note 41.
44 July 15 U.S.-Russia Agreement, supra note 41, para. 4(a).
45 Id., para. 4(c–d).
46 Samantha Power, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Remarks at a UN Security Council Briefing on
the Situation in Syria (July 25, 2016), at https://2009-2017-usun.state.gov/remarks/7381.
47 Id.
48 Id.
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stated that, “Russia, the Assad regime, and other groups fighting around Aleppo should heed
the UN’s call for a weekly 48 hour pause to allow for deliveries of essential supplies.”49
Around August 8, rebel groups temporarily broke the siege of eastern Aleppo,50 but Russia
and Syria quickly responded with increased attacks.51
On September 9, 2016, the United States and Russia reached a new agreement to reaffirm
the COH.52 In a press conference announcing the deal, Secretary Kerry stated that the United
States hoped the arrangement would “reduce violence, ease suffering, and resume movement
towards a negotiated peace and a political transition in Syria,” and that the deal represented a
“more proscriptive and far-reaching approach” than the parties had taken in the past.53
The new agreement integrated the previous arrangements that the United States and
Russia had reached on February 22, March 26, and July 15, 2016.54 It also contained several
additional components. First, the deal required that the parties to the COH on Day D
(September 12, 2016) “recommit to the CoH and honor its terms in full, as set forth in
the February 22, 2016 Joint Declaration of the Russian Federation and the United States,
for a 48 hour period.”55 The agreement emphasized provisions of the original COH that
called for ceasing hostilities, unimpeded access to humanitarian aid, and proportionate use
of force in self-defense.56 On day Dþ2, the agreement stated that “if the CoH in Syria has
continued to hold to the mutual satisfaction of the Sides, they will extend it for a mutually
agreed upon period of time.”57 Second, the agreement contained special provisions to ensure
humanitarian aid could reach Aleppo,58 such as requiring forces to pull back from Castello
Road.59 Third, the agreement required the Syrian Army to cease air operations in designated
areas where the opposition groups were present.60 Fourth, if Syria complied with the prohi-
bition on air operations, the agreement again called for a Joint Implementation Center
between the United States and Russia to target ISIL and al-Nusra.61 In an annex, the
September 9 agreement also stated that “[e]ach Side reserves the right to withdraw from
this arrangement if they believe the terms have not been fulfilled.”62
49 Id.
50 Samantha Power, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Remarks at a UN Security Council Open Arria-
Formula Meeting on Aleppo (Aug. 8, 2016), at https://2009-2017-usun.state.gov/remarks/7397.
51 U.S. Dep’t of State Press Release, Daily Press Briefing (Aug. 16, 2016), at https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/
prs/dpb/2016/08/261082.htm.
52 U.S.-Russia Arrangement Fact Sheet, supra note 14.
53 U.S. Dep’t of State Press Release, Remarks with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and UN Special
Envoy Steffan deMistura at a Press Availability (Sept. 9, 2016), at https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/remarks/
2016/09/261722.htm.
54 SeeU.S. Dep’t of State, September 9 –U.S./Russian Arrangement Reducing Violence, Restoring Access, and
Establishing the JIC (Sept. 9, 2016), at https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/262413.pdf [here-
inafter U.S.-Russian Arrangement Reducing Violence, Restoring Access, and Establishing the JIC]; see also U.S.-
Russia Arrangement Fact Sheet, supra note 14.
55 U.S.-Russian Arrangement Reducing Violence, Restoring Access, and Establishing the JIC, supra note 54,
para. 1.
56 Id.
57 Id., para. 2.
58 Id., para. 3.
59 Id.
60 Id., para. 4.
61 Id., para. 5, ann.
62 Id. at ann.
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Shortly after the United States and Russia agreed to further strengthen the COH, two con-
troversial bombings jeopardized the agreement. First, the United States conducted an air
strike on September 17 that killed approximately sixty Syrian Army soldiers in Dayr Az
Zawr, Syria.63 The U.S. Central Command stated that coalition forces believed that the strike
was against ISIL and that “[t]he coalition airstrike was halted immediately when coalition
officials were informed by Russian officials that it was possible the personnel and vehicles tar-
geted were part of the Syrian military.”64 Moreover, Central Command stated that “coalition
members in the Combined Air Operations Center had earlier informed Russian counterparts
of the upcoming strike” and that “[i]t is not uncommon for the Coalition Air Operations
Center to confer with Russian officials as a professional courtesy and to deconflict
Coalition and Russian aircraft, although such contact is not required by the current U.S.-
Russia Memorandum of Understanding on safety of flight.”65
Syrian and Russian officials condemned the U.S. attack. The Russian Foreign Ministry
stated in a press release that “[t]he operations of coalition pilots, who, we hope, did not act
onWashington’s orders, are on the verge of criminal negligence and are directly pandering to
ISIS terrorists.”66 Moreover, the statement accused U.S.-backed rebel groups of violating the
COH by continuing to conduct attacks against Syrian forces, and it stated that “[w]e once
again insistently urge Washington to exert the necessary pressure on US-patronised illegal
paramilitary units and force them to unfailingly honour the ceasefire.”67 Russia called an
emergency meeting of the UN Security Council to address the incident, and Ambassador
Power commented on the strike in a statement to press before the meeting.68 Although
Power acknowledged the strike and claimed that it was an error, she called the meeting “a
stunt replete with moralism and grandstanding” and “uniquely cynical and hypocritical.”69
Furthermore, Power faulted Russia for failing to convince Syria to honor the agreement by
grounding its air force and by continuing to prevent humanitarian assistance from reaching
those in need.70
63 U.S. Cent. Comm. Press Release, Coalition Halts Airstrike in Progress Against Possible Syrian Military
Position (Sept. 17, 2016), at http://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-Release-View/
Article/947839/coalition-halts-airstrike-in-progress-against-possible-syrian-military-position [hereinafter Cent.
Comm. Press Release]; Ministry of Foreign Aff. of the Russ. Fed’n Press Release, Comment by the
Information and Press Department on U.S.-Led International Anti-ISIS Coalition’s Air Strike Against Syrian
Government Forces’ Positions Near Deir ez-Zor (Sept. 18, 2016), at http://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/
news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/2444527?
p_p_id=101_INSTANCE_cKNonkJE02Bw&_101_INSTANCE_cKNonkJE02Bw_languageId=en_GB
[hereinafter Russian Foreign Ministry Statement on U.S. Attack Against Syrian Troops].
64 Cent. Comm. Press Release, supra note 63.
65 Id. The United States and Russia signed a memorandum of understanding on air safety in Syria on October
20, 2015. U.S. Dep’t of Defense Press Release, U.S., Russia Sign Memorandum on Air Safety in Syria (Oct. 20,
2015), at http://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/624964/us-russia-sign-memorandum-on-air-safety-in-
syria.
66 Russian Foreign Ministry Statement on U.S. Attack Against Syrian Troops, supra note 63.
67 Id.; see also Al-Jaafari: Terrorist War on Syria Disclosed Fragility of International Law, SYRIAN ARAB NEWS
AGENCY (Sept. 19, 2016), at http://sana.sy/en/?p=88431.
68 Samantha Power, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Remarks Before UN Security Council
Consultations on Syria (Sept. 17, 2016), at https://2009-2017-usun.state.gov/remarks/7437.
69 Id.
70 Id.
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Two days after the controversial U.S. bombing, a bombing destroyed a UN convoy deliv-
ering aid to the Aleppo region. According to the United Nations, the strike damaged eighteen
out of thirty-one trucks in the convoy,71 which contained “vital food and medical assis-
tance.”72 The Syrian Arab Red Crescent (SARC), which organized the convoy together
with the United Nations, stated that “[a]round twenty civilians and one SARC staff member
were killed, as they were unloading trucks . . . .”73 UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon called
the attack “sickening, savage, and apparently deliberate” and said that “[a]ccountability for
crimes such as these is essential.”74 In a statement, the UN Under-Secretary-General for
Humanitarian Affairs said: “Let me be clear: if this callous attack is found to be a deliberate
targeting of humanitarians, it would amount to a war crime. I call for an immediate, impartial
and independent investigation into this deadly incident.”75
While none of the combatants took responsibility for the attack, U.S. officials stated that it
had been perpetrated by either Russia or Syria. In a press briefing, the White House press
secretary stated that because the bombing was an air strike, “there only could have been
two entities responsible, either the Syrian regime or the Russian government.”76 The
United States condemned the attack, and it reiterated earlier statements calling on Russia
to honor the recent agreement by restraining Syria and by permitting deliveries of humani-
tarian aid. The State Department issued a press release stating that:
[f]or more than a week, we have urged Moscow to fulfill the commitments it made in Geneva to
facilitate the unimpeded flow of humanitarian aid to the Syrian people. And for more than a week,
the Syrian regime repeatedly denied entry to these UN convoys, preventing them from delivering
urgent food, water and medical supplies to desperate Syrian citizens. Only today did the regime
finally grant permits for some convoys to proceed.77
The United States also issued a joint statement with France, Italy, Germany, the United
Kingdom, and the High Representative of the European Union condemning the bombing.78
The joint statement “call[ed] on Russia to take extraordinary steps to restore the credibility of
71UNRelief Agency Calls for Prompt Investigation into the Attack on Aid Convoy in Syria, UNWEB TV (Sept. 20,
2016), at http://webtv.un.org/meetings-events/watch/un-relief-agency-calls-for-prompt-investigation-into-the-
attack-on-aid-convoy-in-syria/5134269761001.
72 Syria: UN Officials Condemn Attacks Against Aid Convoy and Warehouse in Rural Aleppo, UN NEWS CENTRE
(Sept. 20, 2016), at http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=54969#.WB-X2OErKRss.
73 Syria: Attack on Humanitarian Convoy Is an Attack on Humanity, INT’L FED’N OF RED CROSS &REDCRESCENT
SOCIETIES (Sept. 20, 2016), at http://www.ifrc.org/en/news-and-media/press-releases/general/syria-attack-on-
humanitarian-convoy-is-an-attack-on-humanity.
74 Ban Ki-moon, UN Secretary-General, Address to the General Assembly (Sept. 20, 2016), at https://www.un.
org/sg/en/content/sg/speeches/2016-09-20/address-general-assembly-bilingual-delivered-version.
75 Stephen O’Brien, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator,
Statement on Convoy to Urum al-Kubra (Sept. 19, 2016), at https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/Documents/
ERC_USG%20Stephen%20OBrien%20Statement%20on%20Urum%20al-Kubra,%20SYRIA%2019Sept16.
pdf.
76 White House Press Release, Press Briefing by Press Secretary Josh Earnest and Ben Rhodes (Sept. 20, 2016),
at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/09/20/press-briefing-press-secretary-josh-earnest-and-ben-
rhodes.
77 U.S. Dep’t of State Press Release, Strike on Humanitarian Aid Convoy in Syria (Sept. 19, 2016), at https://
2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2016/09/262151.htm.
78 U.S. Dep’t of State Press Release, Joint Statement on Syria by the Foreign Ministers of France, Italy,
Germany, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the High Representative of the European Union (Sept.
24, 2016), at https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2016/09/262382.htm.
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our efforts, including by halting the indiscriminate bombing by the Syrian regime of its own
people, which has continually and egregiously undermined efforts to end this war.”79
Russian officials denied accusations that the Russian air force attacked the convoy, stating
“with all responsibility that neither Russian, nor Syrian aviation has conducted any strikes
against the UN humanitarian convoy on the southwestern outskirts of Aleppo.”80 Russian
Defense Ministry Spokesperson Igor Konashenkov suggested that opposition groups may
have fired artillery at the convoy, or that the convoy may have caught fire.81 Konashenkov
stated that “Everything shown on the video is the direct consequence that the cargo caught
fire and this began in a strange way simultaneously with carrying out a massive offensive of
militants in Aleppo.”82 Foreign Minister Lavrov also denied that Russia or Syria was respon-
sible and instead suggested that the U.S.-led coalition might have conducted the attack.
According to Lavrov, video footage of the scene showed “traces of aluminum dust, character-
istic of ammunition used by Predator UAVs . . . .”83 Moreover, Russia claimed that it com-
plied with the COHby halting air strikes in agreed zones and by convincing Syria to pull back
from Castello Road.84 Russia accused the United States of failing to separate al-Nusra from
moderate groups, failing to persuade the opposition to retreat from Castello Road, and failing
to provide detailed coordinates of opposition locations.85
On the same day as the attack on the UN convoy, the Syrian Army announced that the
“effect of [the COH] truce regime . . . under the Russian-US agreement has ended.”86 The
Syrian Army claimed that armed terrorist groups had committed three hundred breaches of
the COH in the week since September 12 and that the attacks had killed and injured tens of
civilian and military personnel in Aleppo, Hama, and Quneitra.87 Syria stated that it did its
best to comply with the COH and that it exercised self-restraint in responding to attacks.88
After Syria and Russia resumed attacks in Aleppo, the United States suspended bilateral
communications with Russia to sustain the COH and canceled plans to establish the Joint
Implementation Center.89 The State Department explained the United States’ decision and
79 Id.
80 Ministry of Foreign Aff. of the Russ. Fed’n, Comment by the Information and Press Department on an
Attack on a Humanitarian Convoy in Syria (Sept. 20, 2016), at http://www.mid.ru/en/web/guest/foreign_po-
licy/international_safety/conflicts/-/asset_publisher/xIEMTQ3OvzcA/content/id/2453130.
81 Russia, Syria Did Not Deliver Strikes on UN Aid Convoy Near Aleppo—Ministry, TASS RUSS. NEWS AGENCY
(Sept. 20, 2016), at http://tass.com/world/901003.
82 Id.
83 Ministry of Foreign Aff. of the Russ. Fed’n, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s Television Interview for the
Pozdnyakov Programme on NTV, September 26, 2016 (Sept. 26, 2016), at http://www.mid.ru/en/web/guest/
meropriyatiya_s_uchastiem_ministra/-/asset_publisher/xK1BhB2bUjd3/content/id/2470301.
84 Russian Defense Ministry Says US, Syrian Opposition Fail to Fulfil Geneva deal, TASS RUSS. NEWS AGENCY
(Sept. 19, 2016), at http://tass.com/politics/900792.
85 Id.
86 Army General Command: Truce Effect Ended, Armed Terrorist Groups Didn’t Commit to Any of Its Terms,
SYRIAN ARAB NEWS AGENCY (Sept. 19, 2016), at http://sana.sy/en/?p=88500; see also Syria Declares End of
Ceasefire, US Seeks Clarification from Russia, RT (Sept. 19, 2016), at https://www.rt.com/news/359892-syria-
ceasefire-over-army.
87 Army General Command, supra note 86.
88 Id.
89 U.S. Dep’t of State Press Release, Suspension of Participation in Bilateral Channels with Russia Established
to Sustain the Cessation of Hostilities in Syria (Oct. 3, 2016), at https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2016/
10/262704.htm.
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accused Russia of failing to abide by the terms of the COH and its other international law
obligations:
Russia failed to live up to its own commitments—including its obligations under international
humanitarian law and UNSCR 2254—and was also either unwilling or unable to ensure Syrian
regime adherence to the arrangements to which Moscow agreed. Rather, Russia and the Syrian
regime have chosen to pursue a military course, inconsistent with the Cessation of Hostilities, as
demonstrated by their intensified attacks against civilian areas, targeting of critical infrastructure
such as hospitals, and preventing humanitarian aid from reaching civilians in need, including
through the September 19 attack on a humanitarian aid convoy.
The U.S. will also withdraw personnel that had been dispatched in anticipation of the possible
establishment of the Joint Implementation Center. To ensure the safety of our respective military
personnel and enable the fight against Daesh, the United States will continue to utilize the channel
of communications established with Russia to de-conflict counterterrorism operations in Syria.90
Although the United States suspended bilateral discussions with Russia related to the COH,
the White House stated that “the President directed his team to continue multilateral discus-
sions with key nations with a vested interest in the region to encourage all sides to support a
more durable and sustainable diminution of violence and, more broadly, a diplomatic reso-
lution to the civil war.”91
On the same day that the United States suspended cooperation under the COH, Russia
announced that it would suspend the Plutonium Disposal and Nuclear Management
Agreement between the United States and Russia.92 The conflict in Syria continues.
Russia Suspends Bilateral Agreement with United States Disposal of Weapons-Grade Plutonium
doi:10.1017/ajil.2016.9
In October 2016, Russian President Vladimir Putin suspended the Plutonium
Management and Disposition Agreement (PMDA), a bilateral treaty between Russia and
the United States governing the disposal of surplus weapons-grade plutonium.1 A Russian
Foreign Ministry director explained that the decision was prompted by a “dramatic change
in the situation . . . brought about by the unfriendly steps taken by the United States.”2 He
also cited “the United States’ obvious inability and unwillingness to honour its obligations . . .
90 Id.
91 White House Press Release, Readout of the President’s National Security Council Meeting (Oct. 14, 2016),
at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/10/14/readout-presidents-national-security-council-
meeting.
92 President of Russ. Press Release, Draft Law Suspending the Russia-U.S. Plutonium Management and
Disposition Agreement Submitted to the State Duma (Oct. 3, 2016), at http://en.kremlin.ru/acts/news/53009;
see alsoU.S. Dep’t of State Press Release, Unofficial Composite Text of the United States-Russian Federation 2000
PlutoniumManagement and Disposition Agreement, as Amended, at http://www.state.gov/documents/organiza-
tion/213493.pdf; Kristina Daugirdas & Julian Davis Mortenson, Contemporary Practice of the United States,
111 AJIL __ (2017).
1 Ministry of Foreign Aff. of the Russ. Fed’n Press Release, Remarks by Mikhail Ulyanov, Director of the
Foreign Ministry Department for Non-Proliferation and Arms Control and Representative of the Russian
Federation at the First Committee of the 71st Session of the UNGA, New York, October 3, 2016 (Oct. 4,
2016), at http://www.mid.ru/en/general_assembly/-/asset_publisher/lrzZMhfoyRUj/content/id/2486599 [here-
inafter Remarks by Mikhail Ulyanov].
2 Id.
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on time and in full.”3 The United States expressed disappointment at the suspension, arguing
that continued implementation was in both states’ interests.
The United States and the Russian Federation initially signed the PMDA in 2000.4 As
amended by protocols in 20065 and 2010,6 the PMDA obliges each party to dispose of at
least thirty-four metric tons of disposition plutonium and imposes certain requirements
regarding the method of disposition.7 Of particular note for the present dispute, Article III
(1) provides: “Disposition shall be by irradiation of disposition plutonium as fuel in nuclear
reactors or any other methods that may be agreed by the Parties in writing.”8
The 2010 amendments entered into force following a July 2011 exchange of diplomatic
notes between Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov.9 A
State Department fact sheet described that milestone as
mark[ing] another significant step in both countries’ efforts to eliminate nuclear-weapon-grade
materials and to reduce nuclear dangers. . . . The initial combined amount, 68 metric tons [of
disposition plutonium], represents enough material for about 17,000 nuclear weapons, and the
Agreement envisions disposition of more weapon-grade plutonium over time.10
Importantly, the agreement sought to make “arms reductions irreversible by . . . preventing
the plutonium from ever being reused for weapons or any other military purpose.”11 The
agreement also addresses monitoring, inspections, and financial support.12
3 Id.
4 Unofficial Composite Text of the United States-Russian Federation 2000 Plutonium Management and
Disposition Agreement, as Amended, U.S. Dep’t of State, at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/
213493.pdf [hereinafter Composite Text].
5 Protocol to the Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of
the Russian Federation Concerning the Management and Disposition of Plutonium Designated as No Longer
Required for Defense Purposes and Related Cooperation, Sept. 15, 2006, TIAS No. 11-713.1.
6 Protocol to the Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of
the Russian Federation Concerning the Management and Disposition of Plutonium Designated as No Longer
Required for Defense Purposes and Related Cooperation, Apr. 13, 2010, TIAS No. 11-713.2 [hereinafter
2010 Protocol]; see also John R. Crook, Contemporary Practice of the United States, 104 AJIL 680 (2010).
7 Composite Text, supra note 4, Art. II(1). The PMDA defines “Disposition Plutonium” as “weapon-grade
plutonium that has been (a) withdrawn from nuclear weapon programs, (b) designated as no longer required
for defense purposes, and (c) declared in the Annex.” Id. Art. I(2).
8 Composite Text, supra note 4.
9 U.S. Dep’t of State Press Release, Entry into Force of the U.S.-Russian Agreement to Dispose of Excess
Weapon-Grade Plutonium (July 13, 2011), at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/07/168287.htm [hereinaf-
ter July 13, 2011 Press Release].
10 Id.
11 U.S. Dep’t of State Press Release, 2000 Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement (Apr. 13,
2010), at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2010/04/140097.htm [hereinafter PMDA Press Release]; see
Composite Text, supra note 4 (“One of the key objectives of the Agreement . . . is to reduce irreversibly stockpiles
of weapon-grade plutonium from each side’s nuclear weapons programs.”); see also PlutoniumDisposition Program,
NAT’L NUCLEAR SEC. ADMIN. (June 26, 2013), at https://nnsa.energy.gov/mediaroom/factsheets/pudisposition
[hereinafter Plutonium Disposition Program] (“Weapon-grade plutonium and highly enriched uranium
(HEU) are the critical ingredients for making a nuclear weapon. With the end of the Cold War, hundreds of
tons of these materials were determined to be surplus to U.S. and Russian defense needs. Denying access to plu-
tonium and HEU is the best way to prevent nuclear proliferation to rogue states and terrorist organizations. The
most certain method to prevent these materials from falling into the wrong hands is to dispose of them.”).
12 PMDA Press Release, supra note 11.
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The agreement required disposition of plutonium to begin in 2018.13 As explained in a
2010 press release from the U.S. State Department,
[w]eapon-grade plutonium, unlike weapon-grade uranium, cannot be blended with other mate-
rials to make it unusable in weapons. But it can be fabricated into mixed oxide uranium-pluto-
nium (MOX) fuel and irradiated in civil nuclear power reactors to produce electricity. This
irradiation results in spent fuel, a form that is not usable for weapons or other military purposes
and a form that the Protocol prohibits being changed any time in the future unless subject to
agreed international monitoring measures and only for civil purposes.
The amended PMDA will provide that this weapon-grade plutonium be disposed by irradiating it
in light water reactors in the United States and in fast-neutron reactors operating under certain
nonproliferation conditions in the Russian Federation. The U.S. MOX fuel fabrication facility
being constructed at the Department of Energy’s Savannah River Site is planned to begin oper-
ation in 2016; Russia has already fabricated MOX fuel on a limited basis and is in the process of
constructing/modifying fuel fabrication facilities capable of producing MOX fuel at levels
required to meet the PMDA’s disposition rate.14
The method planned for disposing of plutonium in the United States proved problematic,
however. Construction of the Savannah River fuel fabrication facility far exceeded initial esti-
mates for both budget and timeline.15 In addition, as uranium prices fell since 2010, so too
did demand for MOX fuel.16 In February 2016, the Obama administration’s budget request
for the Department of Energy reflected a plan to terminate the Savannah River site; the bud-
get request also sought $15 million for “a dilute and dispose option that will disposition sur-
plus U.S. weapon-grade plutonium by diluting it and disposing of it at a geologic repository at
significantly lower cost and less time than the MOX option.”17 On the day of the budget
rollout, Secretary of Energy Ernest Moniz stressed that MOX is unaffordable and that
fully funding the facility would require millions of dollars more annually:
The reality is the MOX program, with a lifetime cost certainly north of 30, probably 40, billion
dollars with a need for an additional, say, half a billion dollars a year for decades just does not look
to be affordable. The dilution approach . . . is surely technically less challenging and we believe is
13 July 13, 2011 Press Release, supra note 9.
14 PMDA Press Release, supra note 11; see also Crook, supra note 6, at 681.
15 Mike Eckel, As Putin Swipes at U.S. Over Plutonium Disposal, Nuclear Cooperation Takes a Hit,
RADIOFREEEUROPE (Apr. 23, 2016), at http://www.rferl.org/a/putin-swipes-us-plutonium-disposal/27692331.
html. In 2013, the National Nuclear Security Administration, which bears responsibility for disposition, described
a lack of adequate funding for the MOX disposition it was supposed to undertake: “The current strategy to imple-
ment this agreement [the PMDA] in the United States involves the National Nuclear Security Administration
(NNSA), under the Office of Fissile Materials Disposition, building a Mixed Oxide (MOX) Fuel Fabrication
Facility, a capability to disassemble nuclear weapons pits and convert the resulting plutonium into a form suitable
to be made into MOX fuel, and aWaste Solidification Building to handle the waste resulting from pit disassembly
and MOX operations at the Savannah River Site (SRS). However, unanticipated cost increases for the MOX pro-
ject and plutonium disposition program have prompted theDepartment to slow down theMOXproject and other
activities associated with the current plutonium disposition strategy while determining whether there are options
to complete the mission more efficiently.” Plutonium Disposition Program, supra note 11.
16 Eckel, supra note 15.
17 DEP’T OF ENERGY, DOE/CF-0125, FY 2017 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET REQUEST: BUDGET IN BRIEF 6 (Feb.
2016); see also DEP’T OF ENERGY, DOE/CF-0119 vol. 1, FY 2017 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET REQUEST: NATIONAL
NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION (Feb. 2016). The dilute and dispose method “involves adding the plutonium
to a nonradioactive substance, encasing it in glass or metal-can type containers or oil drums, and burying it at a
federal waste site in NewMexico. Unlike withMOX, experts say this method could still allow for plutonium to be
extracted some day and put back into weapons, though with difficulty.” Eckel, supra note 15.
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less than half the cost, even going forward. . . . I’m sure that we will have a lively discussion about
this in the Congress.18
Putin publicly voiced his concerns about U.S. implementation of the agreement in April
2016. He said:
We signed this agreement and settled on the procedures for the material’s destruction, agreed that
this would be done on an industrial basis, which required the construction of special facilities.
Russia fulfilled its obligations in this regard and built these facilities, but our American partners
did not.
Moreover, only recently, they announced that they plan to dispose of their accumulated highly
enriched nuclear fuel by using a method other than what we agreed on when we signed the corre-
sponding agreement, but by diluting and storing it in certain containers. Thismeans that they preserve
what is known as the breakout potential, in other words it can be retrieved, reprocessed and converted
into weapons-grade plutonium again. This is not what we agreed on.Nowwewill have to think about
what to do about this and how to respond to this.19
The State Department denied that it was violating the PMDA,20 arguing that while
the agreement does specify disposition “by irradiation . . . as fuel in nuclear reactors,” it
also permits disposition by “any other methods that may be agreed by the Parties in writ-
ing.”21 A State Department spokesperson explained:
What I can say is that since 2013 we’ve been in communication with Russia about the U.S. review
of disposition methods and its results that’s consistent with the U.S.-Russia Plutonium
Management and Disposition Agreement. And this agreement essentially provides a path for
the parties to consult and agree on disposition methods that do not involve irradiation in nuclear
reactors.22
Eric Lund, a spokesperson for the State Department’s Bureau of International Security and
Nonproliferation, indicated that the consultations to reach the necessary agreement would
take place at some point in the future: “Accommodating any such new method of disposal
. . . requires written agreement between the parties; we would expect such consultations on a
separate agreement to begin at an appropriate later time.”23
18 FY 2017 Budget Request: NNSA Up 2.9%; Showdown with South Carolina Delegation on MOX Looms, AM.
INST. OF PHYSICS (Feb. 18, 2016), at https://www.aip.org/fyi/2016/fy-2017-budget-request-nnsa-29-showdown-
south-carolina-delegation-mox-looms.
19 President of Russ. Press Release, Truth and Justice Regional and LocalMedia Forum (Apr. 7, 2016), at http://
en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/51685.
20 Eckel, supra note 15.
21 See 2010 Protocol, supra note 6, Art. III(1).
22 U.S. Dep’t of State Press Release, Daily Press Briefing (Apr. 11, 2016), at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/
2016/04/255708.htm.
23 Eckel, supra note 15. In June 2015, U.S. Secretary of Energy Ernest Moniz established a Plutonium
Disposition Red Team “to assess options for the disposition of 34MT of surplus weapon-grade plutonium.”
The Team’s Final Report, published in August of that year, warned that electing the cheaper “Dilute and
Dispose” process, over continued support of MOX, would have political ramifications perhaps less positive
than its practical consequences. “The review team . . . believes that the Dilute and Dispose approach meets the
requirements for permanent disposition, but recognizes that this assertion will ultimately be subject to agreement
with the Russians, and that the decision will be as much political as technical.”However, it noted that “[t]he com-
bination of evolving international circumstances and the fact that the U.S. has already accommodated a Russian
national interest in a previous PMDAmodification causes the Red Team to believe that the federal government has
a reasonable position with which to enter PMDA negotiations.” THOMMASON, FINAL REPORT OF THE PLUTONIUM
DISPOSITION RED TEAM (2015), at https://nnsa.energy.gov/sites/default/files/nnsa/inlinefiles/Pu-Disposition-Red-
Team-Report-081315vFinal-SM.pdf.
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Over the following months, the U.S. Congress and the administration went back and forth
over the future of the Savannah River site. Legislators—especially from South Carolina,
where the site is located—supported the continuation of funding.24 The administration con-
tinued to oppose it. In a June 2016 “Statement of Administration Policy,” the Executive
Office of the President wrote:
The Administration strongly objects to continued construction of the Mixed Oxide (MOX) Fuel
Fabrication Facility . . . . Even with a firm fixed-price contract for the MOX Fuel Fabrication
Facility, numerous previous studies have confirmed that the alternative disposition method is
expected to be significantly faster and less expensive . . . . The already-proven alternative method
of disposition is expected to be significantly faster and less expensive than theMOX approach, has
far lower risks, and will begin to move plutonium out of the State of South Carolina much
sooner.25
Although the Department of Energy requested $270 million in funding for MOX—and the
president supported that figure—the House’s National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2017 allocated $340 million to the project, roughly 20 percent more than requested.26
(The version of that bill that was later enacted likewise authorized $340 million.27)
On October 3, 2016, Putin submitted a draft law to the State Duma that would
suspend the PMDA.28 Following the Duma’s approval, Putin signed it into law on
October 31.29 Russia’s Office of the President offered a detailed explanation for the legisla-
tion. In addition to citing planned changes in the United States’ methods for disposing of
plutonium, that explanation referenced the U.S. military presence in Eastern Europe and
U.S. sanctions:
Recently, the United States has attempted to revise its plutonium disposition strategy outlined in
the 2010 Protocol and change its disposition methods. The US plans to dispose of its plutonium
by burial instead of irradiation as stipulated by the Protocol. Even back when the Agreement was
in development, Russian experts objected to such approach as not irreversible. The 2000 amend-
ments provided for the major part of the American plutonium to be irradiated and only a small
amount to be buried underground. The Protocol of April 13, 2010, completely discarded the pos-
sibility of burying plutonium, which was part of a compromise reached during the drafting of the
Protocol.
24 See, e.g., U.S. Senator Lindsey Graham Press Release, GrahamOpposes Obama Budget andObama Proposal
on MOX Funding (Feb. 9, 2016), at http://www.lgraham.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/press-releases?
ID=C5871C66-556D-474B-89E8-70031346BC68 (“The Obama Administration’s reckless proposal to termi-
nate theMOX program, without a proven disposition plan in place, is both ill-conceived and dangerous. This isn’t
the first time they have proposed halting theMOX program, but given the fact their time in office is running short,
thankfully it is their last.”); Derrek Asberry, Senate Committee Seeks $340Million for MOX, POST&COURIER (May
12, 2016), at http://www.postandcourier.com/archives/senate-committee-seeks-m-for-mox/article_22ee8f50-
0605-5bef-ab6e-2b504ece73ba.html; Mary Orndorff Troyan, Congress Divided on MOX Funding, GREENVILLE
ONLINE (Apr. 13, 2016, 5:22 PM), at http://www.greenvilleonline.com/story/news/politics/2016/04/13/con-
gress-divided-mox-funding/82985230.
25 OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATION POLICY:
S.2943—NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2017 (2016).
26 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, H.R. 4909, 114th Cong., 1230–31, 1388 (2016).
27 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, Pub. L. No. 114-328 (2016).
28 President of Russ. Press Release, Draft Law Suspending the Russia-US Plutonium Management and
Disposition Agreement Submitted to the State Duma (Oct. 3, 2016), at http://en.kremlin.ru/acts/news/5300
[hereinafter Draft Law Submitted to State Duma].
29 President of Russ. Press Release, Law Suspending Russian-US Plutonium Management and Disposition
Agreement (PMDA) Signed (Oct. 31, 2016), at http://en.kremlin.ru/acts/news/53167.
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It should be noted that to date, the US has not requested Russia’s approval in order to change its
plutonium disposition method.
After the Agreement and its protocols came in force, the United States took a number of steps
resulting in a fundamental change in strategic stability.
Under the pretext of the crisis in Ukraine, the United States is building up its military presence in
Eastern Europe, including the states that joined NATO after 2000—the year when the agreement
was signed. In 2015 six new forward command posts were deployed in Bulgaria, Latvia, Poland,
Romania and Estonia. Their main task is to ensure rapid transfer of large NATO troop contin-
gents to Eastern Europe in the event that the order is given. Units of the US Armed Forces have
been introduced in the Baltic states and the number of NATO aircraft based on their airfields has
been increased. In Ukraine, American instructors are training militants from the Right Sector,
which is banned in Russia.
Apart from actions aimed at changing the military-strategic balance, the United States is taking
measures to weaken the Russian economy and violate the rights of Russian citizens. Thus, in
2012 the United States passed the so-called Sergei Magnitsky law in accordance with
which Washington openly sought to protect economic crime in the Russian Federation. In
2014 Washington passed a law supporting the freedom of Ukraine, which allows it to
interfere in the domestic affairs of Russia. In addition, in 2014 the United States introduced
sanctions against the Russian Federation, some of its territories, as well as companies and
individuals.30
Mikhail Ulyanov, Director of the ForeignMinistry Department for Non-Proliferation and
Arms Control, reiterated the above concerns and also provided more detail about Russian
objections to the United States’ plans regarding disposition methods:
In particular, the PMDA and the April 13, 2010 Protocol to it provide for the irradiation of dis-
position weapon-grade plutonium as fuel in nuclear reactors. This method was agreed upon to
reduce irreversibly stockpiles of weapon-grade plutonium from each side’s nuclear weapons pro-
grammes.
The Russian Federation has taken all the necessary measures to fulfil its obligations under the
PMDA. It has created and brought to full power the BN-800 fast neutron reactor to irradiate
disposition weapon-grade plutonium as fuel and completed the construction of a facility for
the fabrication of mixed uranium-plutonium fuel.
At the same time, the United States has not implemented its obligations and it is unlikely that it
will do so in the near future. The Savannah River facility for the fabrication of mixed uranium
oxide-plutonium oxide (MOX) fuel is only two-thirds finished and the project has been sus-
pended. The United States has not modified its reactors for the use of this fuel. Ultimately,
US experts have concluded that the United States will need another 20 to 30 years to start dis-
posing of weapon-grade plutonium in keeping with US-Russian agreements, whereas both
countries were to begin disposition by 2018.
In this situation, the United States has decided, without consulting the Russian Federation, to
dispose of its plutonium in a different manner—bymixing it with radioactive waste and burying
it underground in rooms that have been excavated within a salt formation. This disposition was
discussed during the drafting of the PMDA and was discarded as not irreversible. Therefore, the
PMDA as amended by the 2010 Protocol does not stipulate the possibility of the underground
burial of disposition plutonium.
30 Draft Law Submitted to State Duma, supra note 28; see alsoMinistry of Foreign Aff. of the Russ. Fed’n Press
Release, Comment by the Foreign Ministry on the Presidential Executive Order Suspending the Plutonium
Management and Disposition Agreement (Oct. 3, 2016), at http://www.mid.ru/en/web/guest/kommentarii_-
predstavitelya/-/asset_publisher/MCZ7HQuMdqBY/content/id/2485021 (reiterating these complaints).
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Under the PMDA, the parties are to consult each other in advance of any change in their dis-
posal methods. The United States has not officially notified Russia of its intention to use an
alternative disposition method.
Despite this, the United States was unilaterally preparing to dispose of its plutonium in a man-
ner that has been previously rejected. In particular, the US administration has indicated that it
will terminate the MOX programme, based on the Fiscal Year 2017 Budget Request.
Considering that Russia has financed the bulk of its planned investment in the creation of facil-
ities to dispose of plutonium in keeping with a method that was coordinated with its US part-
ners, we are perplexed, to put it mildly, by US officials’ statements on Washington’s intention
to save money by choosing an alternative disposal method.31
Separately, Ulyanov argued that the suspension is “fully in keeping with Article 62 of the
1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.”32 Article 62 provides, in relevant part:
1. A fundamental change of circumstances which has occurred with regard to those
existing at the time of the conclusion of a treaty, and which was not foreseen by
the parties, may not be invoked as a ground for terminating or withdrawing from
the treaty unless:
(a) the existence of those circumstances constituted an essential basis of the con-
sent of the parties to be bound by the treaty; and
(b) the effect of the change is radically to transform the extent of obligations still
to be performed under the treaty . . . .
. . .
3. If, under the foregoing paragraphs, a party may invoke a fundamental change of
circumstances as a ground for terminating or withdrawing from a treaty it may
also invoke the change as a ground for suspending the operation of the treaty.33
At a press briefing on October 3, Elizabeth Trudeau, Director of the State Department
Press Office, commented on Russia’s decision without addressing the Vienna Convention
argument for suspension:
We regret Russia’s decision to suspend this agreement unilaterally. The United States remains
committed to the agreement. We believe it’s in the best interests of both the United States and
Russia as part of our efforts to secure nuclear materials and combat nuclear terrorism. I would note
this is the latest in a series of steps by Russia to end longstanding cooperation on nuclear security
and disarmament, including its decision to not participate in the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit,
and its unwillingness to continue strategic arms control reductions.
I would also note it’s disingenuous of Russia to cite the United States threat to strategic stability as
a reason for this decision. The United States seeks a constructive dialogue with Russia on strategic
issues, but it is Russia instead who continues to engage in destabilizing activities, and to suspend
cooperation under existing agreements like this one that benefit international security.34
31 Remarks by Mikhail Ulyanov, supra note 1.
32 Id.; see also Draft Law Submitted to State Duma, supra note 28 (“The actions taken by the United States
fundamentally changed the circumstances in which the Agreement and its protocols were signed. Therefore,
the suspension of the Agreement is a reciprocal measure by the Russian Federation and does not violate the
1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Importantly, the plutonium covered by the Agreement remains
outside the nuclear weapons sphere, which attests to Russia’s commitment to limiting nuclear arms.”).
33 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
34 U.S. Dep’t of State Press Release, Daily Press Briefing (Oct. 3, 2016), at https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/
2016/10/262717.htm.
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At another briefing on the same day, Press Secretary Josh Earnest said:
This is an announcement that we were disappointed by. The decision by the Russians to unilat-
erally withdraw from this commitment is disappointing . . . . The United States has been steadfast
since 2011 in implementing our side of the bargain, and we would like to see the Russians con-
tinue to do the same thing.35
In a subsequent briefing, Earnest emphasized that continued implementation was in the
national interest of both parties:
[T]he United States believes that these are important priorities, and we’re hopeful that agreements
that were reached by the Russian government—or between the United States and Russian gov-
ernment that were rooted in each side’s national interest will continue to be pursued, not just
because of the explicit obligation that they have to pursue those agreements, but because of the
clear national interest that they have in seeing those agreements thrive.36
Along these same lines, State Department Deputy Spokesperson Mark C. Toner called the
suspension a “real tragedy, because . . . it’s in the interest of . . . both our countries to continue
those efforts.”37
The United States Makes Payment to Family of Italian Killed in CIA Air Strike
doi:10.1017/ajil.2016.8
In January 2015, a CIA drone killed an Italian aid worker named Giovanni Lo Porto dur-
ing a strike on an Al Qaeda compound in the Pakistan-Afghanistan border region. In July
2016, the Obama Administration reached a settlement agreement with Lo Porto’s family
that included a payment by the United States of more than one million euros.
In early 2012, Lo Porto traveled to Pakistan for a job with an NGO that was helping to
rebuild an area damaged by floods.1 Soon after his arrival, Al Qaeda operatives kidnapped
him.2 Lo Porto’s captors also held Dr. WarrenWeinstein, an American working as a contrac-
tor for the U.S. Agency for International Development who had been kidnapped in 2011.3
Italian authorities reportedly told Lo Porto’s family in December 2014 “that they were in
contact with intermediaries and making progress on negotiations.”4
In January 2015, the United States bombed the compound where Lo Porto andWeinstein
were being held. Both men were killed, along with Ahmed Farouq, a U.S. national and Al
35 White House Press Release, Press Briefing by Press Secretary Josh Earnest (Oct. 3, 2016), at https://www.
whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/10/03/press-briefing-press-secretary-josh-earnest-1032016.
36 White House Press Release, Press Briefing by Press Secretary Josh Earnest (Oct. 5, 2016), at https://www.
whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/10/05/press-briefing-press-secretary-josh-earnest-1052016.
37 U.S. Dep’t of State Press Release, Daily Press Briefing (Oct. 5, 2016), at https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/
2016/10/262821.htm.
1 Peter Baker,Obama Apologizes After Drone Kills American and Italian Held by Al Qaeda, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 23,
2015), at http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/24/world/asia/2-qaeda-hostages-were-accidentally-killed-in-us-
raid-white-house-says.html.
2 Elisabetta Povoledo, Giovanni Lo Porto Was Known as Aid Worker Drawn to Needy, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 23,
2015), at http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/24/world/europe/american-drone-strike-italian-aid-worker-gio-
vanni-lo-porto.html.
3 Baker, supra note 1.
4 Cora Currier, One Year On, No Justice for Italian Hostage Killed in U.S. Drone Strike, INTERCEPT (Mar. 15,
2016, 8:04 PM), at https://theintercept.com/2016/03/15/one-year-on-no-justice-for-giovanni-lo-porto-italian-
hostage-killed-in-us-drone-strike.
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Qaeda leader whose presence at the compound had not previously been known.5 As President
Barack Obama later explained, the attack was based on “hundreds of hours of surveillance”
that demonstrated the presence of Al Qaeda operatives.6 Obama also asserted that there had
been no indication that the hostages or other civilians were present at the location.7
In the wake of the operation, U.S. intelligence professionals conducted a “battle damage
assessment . . . to determine the results of the operation and whether . . . any[] civilian casu-
alties occurred.”8 According to the White House, the intelligence community concluded
“with a high degree of confidence that Dr. Weinstein had been killed in a U.S. government
counterterrorism operation. The president was briefed by his national security team soon after
that high-confidence assessment was completed.”9 On April 22, 2015, “members of the
national security apparatus” officially informed Weinstein’s family that Weinstein had
been killed during of a U.S. government counterterrorism operation.10 Obama called
Italian Prime Minister Matteo Renzi personally to report Lo Porto’s killing;11 the two had
not discussed Lo Porto during Renzi’s visit to the White House the week before.12
In a public statement on April 23, Obama apologized for the killings:
As President and as Commander-in-Chief, I take full responsibility for all our counterterrorism
operations, including the one that inadvertently took the lives of Warren and Giovanni. I pro-
foundly regret what happened. On behalf of the United States government, I offer our deepest
apologies to the families.13
As Press Secretary Josh Earnest subsequently explained, the president had not personally
approved the strike:
The President did not specifically sign off on these two operations. There are policies and protocols in
place for our counterterrorismprofessionals tomake decisions about carrying out these kinds of oper-
ations based on a wide variety of things, including an assessment of near certainty that the target is an
al Qaeda target and that civilians would not be harmed if the operation were carried out.14
The procedures outlined in this statement appear to align with a 2013 Presidential Policy
Guidance paper which articulated “the standard operating procedures for when the United
States takes direct action, which refers to lethal and non-lethal uses of force, including capture
5 SeeWhite House Press Release, Press Briefing by Press Secretary Josh Earnest (Apr. 23, 2015), at https://www.
whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/04/23/press-briefing-press-secretary-josh-earnest-4232015 [hereinafter
April 23, 2015, Press Briefing].
6 White House Press Release, Statement by the President on the Deaths of WarrenWeinstein and Giovanni Lo
Porto (Apr. 23, 2015), at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/04/23/statement-president-deaths-
warren-weinstein-and-giovanni-lo-porto [hereinafter Statement by the President on the Deaths of Warren
Weinstein and Giovanni Lo Porto].
7 Id.
8 April 23, 2015, Press Briefing, supra note 5.
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 Baker, supra note 1; April 23, 2015, Press Briefing, supra note 5.
12 White House Press Release, Press Briefing by Press Secretary Josh Earnest (Apr. 24, 2015), at https://www.
whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/04/24/press-briefing-press-secretary-josh-earnest-4242015.
13 Statement by the President on the Deaths of Warren Weinstein and Giovanni Lo Porto, supra note 6.
14 April 23, 2015, Press Briefing, supra note 5.
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operations, against terrorist targets outside the United States and areas of active hostilities.”15
The rules set forth in that document only directly require presidential approval of a strike if
“the proposed individual is a U.S person” or if “there is a lack of consensus among Principals
regarding the nomination. . . .”16
In conjunction with his statement, Obama “directed that the existence of this operation be
declassified and disclosed publicly.”17 He also emphasized that the battle damage assessment had
concluded “that this operation was fully consistent with the guidelines under which [the U.S.]
conduct[s] counterterrorism efforts in the region . . . .”18 Earnest likewise asserted that “the oper-
ation was lawful and conducted consistent with our counterterrorism policies,”19 and specifically
that it had satisfied the government’s “near-certainty standard.” Earnest stated:
[Here,] that near-certainty standard applied to two things.
The first is near certainty that this was an alQaeda compound that was used by alQaeda leaders; that
turned out to be true. That assessment did turn out to be correct. The other near-certainty assess-
ment was that no civilians would be harmed if this operation were carried out. Unfortunately, that
was not correct, and the operation led to this tragic, unintended consequence.20
Earnest also emphasized that “we are conducting a thorough independent review to under-
stand fully what happened and how we can prevent this type of tragic incident in the
future.”21 During the press briefing, Earnest disclosed that the U.S. government planned
to provide compensation to the families ofWeinstein and Lo Porto, but provided no details.22
Italian officials had mixed reactions to Obama’s announcement. Renzi told reporters that
the kidnappers were ultimately responsible for the deaths of Weinstein and Lo Porto and
praised Obama’s transparency.23 The chair of the Italian Parliamentary Committee for the
Intelligence and Security Services, however, said that Italy was not properly informed about
the strike: “‘Was it against someone or against a generic target? . . . We want to know.’” 24
In July, the Obama administration, via its embassy in Rome, reached an agreement to pay
Lo Porto’s family nearly 1.2 million euros, though according to a press report, U.S. officials
said that the actual sum was closer to 2.6 million euros.25 The agreement is governed by
Italian law, and stipulates:
15 Presidential Policy Guidance, Procedures for Approving Direct Action Against Terrorist Targets Located
Outside the United States and Areas of Active Hostilities (May 22, 2013), at https://www.justice.gov/oip/foia-
library/procedures_for_approving_direct_action_against_terrorist_targets/download [hereinafter Presidential
Policy Guidelines]. See Kristina Daugirdas & Julian Davis Mortenson, Contemporary Practice of the United
States, 110 AJIL 811 (2016).
16 Presidential Policy Guidelines, supra note 15.
17 Statement by the President on the Deaths of Warren Weinstein and Giovanni Lo Porto, supra note 6.
18 Id.
19 White House Press Release, Statement by the Press Secretary (Apr. 23, 2015), at https://www.whitehouse.
gov/the-press-office/2015/04/23/statement-press-secretary [hereinafter Statement by the Press Secretary].
20 April 23, 2015 Press Briefing, supra note 5.
21 Statement by the Press Secretary, supra note 19.
22 April 23, 2015 Press Briefing, supra note 5.
23 SeeBaker, supra note 1;Will Dunham& Julia Edwards,U.S. Strike Inadvertently Killed U.S., ItalianHostages;
Obama Apologizes, REUTERS (Apr. 23, 2015, 5:15 PM), at http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-security-hos-
tages-idUSKBN0NE1MI20150423.
24 Baker, supra note 1.
25 Under the agreement, “[t]he United States of America . . . propose[s] to donate as an ex gratia payment in the
memory ofMr. Giovanni Lo Porto, born in Palermo, on June 23, 1977, deceased in Pakistan, the amount of Euros
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This does not imply the consent by the United States of America to the exercise of jurisdiction of
the Italian Courts in disputes, if any, directly or indirectly connected with this instrument.
Nothing in this instrument implies a waiver to sovereign or personal immunity.26
The embassy has not provided further details about the circumstances under which the
agreement was concluded.27
The payment reportedly marked the first of its kind “made by the US government to the
family of a drone-strike victim killed outside a declared war zone.”28 As of the date of pub-
lication, the U.S. government had not reached an agreement with the family of Warren
Weinstein.29
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW
United States Ratifies Hague Convention on the International Recovery of Child Support and
Other Forms of Family Maintenance
doi:10.1017/ajil.2016.6
The United States deposited its instrument of ratification for the Hague Convention on
the International Recovery of Child Support and Other Forms of Family Maintenance (the
Convention)1 in September 2016.2 The Convention entered into force for the United States
several months later.3 Ratification was facilitated by the passage of novel federal implement-
ing legislation that—rather than directly mandating alterations to the domestic legal structure
—created a financial incentive for states to change their child support laws. While the Idaho
1,185,092.10 . . . to [two members of Lo Porto’s family].” Instrument No. 1258, Proposal of Donation (July 8,
2016) at http://inchieste.repubblica.it/it/repubblica/rep-it/2016/09/15/news/morte_lo_porto_l_atto_di_dona-
zione_degli_usa_alla_famiglia-147849038 [hereinafter U.S.-Italy Agreement]; Greg Miller & Greg Jaffe, U.S.
Agrees to Pay Nearly $3 Million to Family of Italian Killed in CIA Strike, WASH. POST (Sept. 16, 2016), at
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-agrees-to-pay-nearly-3-million-to-family-of-ital-
ian-killed-in-cia-strike/2016/09/16/5c213af6-7c1a-11e6-bd86-b7bbd53d2b5d_story.html. See also Stephanie
Kirchgaessner, US to Pay €1m to Family of Italian Aid Worker Killed in Drone Strike, GUARDIAN (Sept. 16,
2016), at https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/sep/16/us-to-pay-1m-euros-family-italian-giovanni-lo-
porto-drone-strike.
26 U.S.-Italy Agreement, supra note 25, Art. 10.
27 Kirchgaessner, supra note 25.
28 Id. (“Experts say it is already understood that the US offers condolence payments to the families of civilian
casualties of airstrikes in Afghanistan and Iraq, but that the Lo Porto agreement stands out because he was killed in
Pakistan and because documents show the US was directly involved in the payment.”).
29 Miller & Jaffe, supra note 25.
1 U.S. Dep’t of State Press Release, United States Deposits Its Instrument of Ratification for the Hague
Convention on the International Recovery of Child Support and Other Forms of Family Maintenance (Sept.
7, 2016), at http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2016/09/261631.htm [hereinafter remarks on Hague
Convention Ratification]; Convention on the International Recovery of Child Support and Other Forms of
Family Maintenance, Nov. 23, 2007 [hereinafter Hague Maintenance Convention]. President Barack Obama
had previously signed the instrument of ratification on August 30, 2016. White House Press Release,
Statement by NSC Spokesperson Ned Price on the Hague Convention on International Recovery of Child
Support and Other Forms of Family Maintenance (Aug. 30, 2016), at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2016/08/30/statement-nsc-spokesperson-ned-price-hague-convention-international [hereinafter Price
Statement].
2 Remarks on Hague Convention Ratification, supra note 1.
3 Id.
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legislature displayed some initial resistance, by early 2016 all fifty states had changed the
relevant laws, enabling the submission of U.S. ratification.
According to aNational Security Council spokesperson, the Convention “contains numer-
ous groundbreaking provisions that, for the first time on a global scale, will establish uniform,
simple, fast, and inexpensive procedures for the processing of international child support cases
. . . .”4 U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry added:
The United States already has a comprehensive system to establish, recognize, and enforce domes-
tic and international child support obligations. The Convention requires that all [parties] have
similar systems in place. As a result, more children in the United States and abroad should receive
more support, more expeditiously than ever before.5
The Office of Child Support Enforcement (OCSE)6 identified several key aspects of the
Convention. First, it
will greatly speed up the enforcement of U.S. orders. It limits the circumstances under which a
court can review and object to an order. It requires recognition of a U.S. order unless a respondent
timely raises a challenge and it limits available objections that the respondent may raise to those
similar to ones now allowed under U.S. law.7
Second,
[t]he Convention recognizes U.S. due process requirements. It allows a challenge to recognition of
a foreign support order if there was a lack of notice and an opportunity for a hearing. It allows a
challenge if the order does not comply with U.S. jurisdictional rules. And it allows a court to refuse
recognition of an order if it is manifestly incompatible with public policy.8
Third, the Convention “requires [parties] to provide free legal assistance in child support
cases,” something U.S. agencies are already required to do.9 Finally, “[t]he Convention pro-
vides standardized procedures and timeframes. Each [party] must follow certain procedures to
recognize and enforce child support orders. They must meet certain timeframes for allowing a
challenge to an order and for providing status updates.”10
The United States has supported the Convention since its inception. According to OCSE,
“[t]he United States actively participated in the development of the Convention from the
beginning of negotiations in 2003.”11 The Convention was concluded on November 23,
4 Price Statement, supra note 1.
5 Remarks on Hague Convention Ratification, supra note 1.
6 OCSE is the federal agency responsible for overseeing the national child support program and helping state
child support agencies manage state programs in compliance with federal law. About the Office of Child Support
Enforcement (OCSE), OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT (last updated Aug. 18, 2016), at http://www.acf.
hhs.gov/css/about.
7 OFF. CHILD SUPPORT ENF’T, U.S. RATIFICATION OF HAGUE CHILD SUPPORT CONVENTION, DCL-16-11 (2016),
at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/css/resource/us-ratification-of-hague-child-support-convention; see also Hague
Maintenance Convention, supra note 1, Arts. 23 (specifying procedure for recognizing and enforcing orders),
23(7) (describing exclusive grounds for challenging recognition or enforcement).
8 OFF. CHILD SUPPORT ENF’T, supra note 7; see alsoHagueMaintenance Convention, supra note 1, Arts. 20, 22,
23(7).
9 OFF. CHILD SUPPORT ENF’T, supra note 7; see also Hague Maintenance Convention, supra note 1, Art. 14.
10 OFF. CHILD SUPPORT ENF’T, supra note 7; see also Hague Maintenance Convention, supra note 1, Art. 23.
11 OFF. CHILD SUPPORT ENF’T, supra note 7.
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2007, and the United States was the first country to sign it a few weeks later.12 In September
2008, then-President Bush recommended that the Senate consent to ratification “at the ear-
liest possible date,” noting that entry into force of the Convention “would be in the interests
of U.S. families, as it would enable them to receive child support owed by debtors abroad
more quickly and reliably.”13
The Bush administration recommended two reservations to the Convention.14 The first
proposed reservation related to certain portions of Article 20(1).15 Absent a reservation, these
provisions would require the United States to recognize and enforce decisions made by judi-
cial or administrative authorities of other states parties in the following cases: (1) where “the
creditor was habitually resident in [that state] at the time proceedings were instituted;” (2)
where “there has been agreement to the jurisdiction in writing by the parties,” except “in dis-
putes relating to maintenance obligations in respect of children;” and (3) where “the decision
[regarding maintenance obligations] was made by an authority exercising jurisdiction on a
matter of personal status or parental responsibility, unless that jurisdiction was based solely
on the nationality of one of the parties.”16
The Bush administration objected to these provisions, for the following reasons: First, “[i]n
order to satisfy [U.S.] due process standards, there must be a nexus between the debtor and
the forum in order to give the forum jurisdiction over the debtor. In other words, it is the
respondent’s (debtor’s) contacts with the forum, not the petitioner’s (creditor’s), that are
determinative.”17 Second, [i]n the United States, the general state-law rule is that forum selec-
tion clauses in divorce, spousal support and child support cases are unenforceable if the cho-
sen forum has no nexus with either party.”18 Third,
[i]n the United States, a competent authority must have personal jurisdiction over the parties. The
fact that a court has in rem jurisdiction over a marriage, for example, does not mean that the court
has personal jurisdiction over the parties. Without the requisite minimum contacts for personal
jurisdiction, a U.S. court cannot issue a valid order.19
The second reservation recommended by the administration related to a provision requir-
ing the acceptance of certain communications in the French language.20
12 John R. Crook, Contemporary Practice of the United States, 102 AJIL 377 (2008); U.S. Dep’t of State Press
Release, Senate Approval of the Hague Convention on the International Recovery of Child Support and Other
Forms of Family Maintenance (Oct. 1, 2010), at http://www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2010/10/
148555.htm [hereinafter Oct. 1, 2010 Press Release].
13 SENATE CONSIDERATION OF TREATY DOC. 110–21, at iv (2008), at https://www.congress.gov/110/cdoc/
tdoc21/CDOC-110tdoc21.pdf.
14 The Convention permits both reservations. Hague Maintenance Convention, supra note 1, Art. 62.
15 SENATE CONSIDERATION OF TREATY DOC. NO. 110–21, supra note 13, at xxvi.
16 Hague Maintenance Convention, supra note 1, Art. 20(1)(c), (e)–(f).
17 SENATE CONSIDERATION OF TREATY DOC. NO. 110–21, supra note 13, at xv.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 S. EXEC. REP. NO. 111–2, at 8 (Jan. 22, 2010), at https://www.congress.gov/111/crpt/erpt2/CRPT-
111erpt2.pdf. The Convention requires parties to designate a Central Authority to “transmit and receive” appli-
cations for the recognition and enforcement of orders and “initiate or facilitate the institution of proceedings in
respect of such applications.” Hague Maintenance Convention, supra note 1, Art. 6(1). On December 8, 2016,
President Obama issued an executive order that designated the Department of Health and Human Services as the
Central Authority of the United States for Purposes of the Convention. Executive Order No. 13752, 81 FED. REG.
90181 (Dec. 8, 2016).
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On September 29, 2010, the Senate gave its advice and consent to ratify the Convention
subject to the reservations recommended by the administration.21 The Senate added one fur-
ther understanding introduced by Senator Jim DeMint.22 The preamble to the Convention
recalls certain provisions of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, a human rights
treaty to which the United States is not a party.23 The understanding notes the United States
nonparty status, and goes on to state: “[A] mention of the Convention [on the Rights of the
Child] in the preamble of this Treaty does not create any obligations and does not affect or
enhance the status of the Convention as a matter of United States or international law.”24
The Senate also expressed its view that the Convention is not self-executing.25
Accordingly, additional steps to implement the Convention were necessary prior to its rati-
fication. During its consideration of the Convention, the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee observed that
the Convention is largely consistent with current U.S. federal and state law and practice in the child
support enforcement area. As a result, onlyminimal changes toU.S. lawwould be required to allow for
implementation of the Convention. The requisite changes would be achieved through adoption of an
amended version of [the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA)] by states and other relevant
jurisdictions, as well as through conforming amendments to Title IV of the Social Security Act.26
The Committee further stated that “the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws . . . [had] approved model state implementing legislation for the Convention through
proposed amendments to the UIFSA, referred to as UIFSA 2008.”27 Those amendments “provide
[d] guidelines and procedures for the registration, recognition, enforcement and modification [in
state courts] of foreign support orders from countries that are parties to the Convention.”28
21Oct. 1, 2010 Press Release, supra note 12; see also S. Res. of Ratification, paras. 2, 4, 111thCong., CONG. REC.
S7719, S7720 (Sept. 29, 2010).
22 CONG. REC., supra note 21, at S7720.
23 Hague Maintenance Convention, supra note 1, pmbl:
“Recalling that, in accordance with Articles 3 and 27 of theUnited Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child of
20 November 1989,
• in all actions concerning children the best interests of the child shall be a primary
consideration,
• every child has a right to a standard of living adequate for the child’s physical, mental,
spiritual, moral and social development,
• the parent(s) or others responsible for the child have the primary responsibility to
secure, within their abilities and financial capacities, the conditions of living necessary
for the child’s development, and
• States Parties should take all appropriate measures, including the conclusion of inter-
national agreements, to secure the recovery of maintenance for the child from the parent
(s) or other responsible persons, in particular where such persons live in a State different
from that of the child[.]”
24 CONG. REC., supra note 21, at S7720.
25 Id.
26 S. EXEC. REP. NO. 111–2, supra note 20, at 6.
27 Id. at 6–7. See generally UNIF. INTERSTATE FAM. SUPPORT ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2008).
28 The Uniform Interstate Family Support Act Amendments (2008): A Summary 1, UNIF. LAW COMM’N, at http://
www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/interstate%20family%20support/UIFSA%202008%20Summary.pdf; see also
OFF. CHILD SUPPORT ENF’T, UNIFORM INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT (2008) AND HAGUE TREATY PROVISIONS
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The Bush Administration submitted a legislative proposal to Congress to effectuate the
necessary changes to federal law. In the absence of congressional action, the Obama
Administration resubmitted the proposal in October 2009.29
On September 29, 2014, President Obama signed the Preventing Sex Trafficking and
Strengthening Families Act (the Act), which contained the implementing legislation for
the Convention.30 That legislation amended Section 466(f) of the Social Security Act,
which governs the states’ implementation of UIFSA.31 The amended act effectively requires
all states to enact the UIFSA 2008 amendments by threatening to withhold federal funds for
child support programs from states that fail to make the necessary changes.32
This method of implementing the United States’ treaty obligations is a novel one; OCSE
explained the administration’s approach as follows:
Child support enforcement in the United States has traditionally been the province of state and
local jurisdictional authorities. . . .
Beginning in 1984, however, Congress determined that because of the tendency of parents to
travel from state to state, and the fact that parents of a child often live in different states, it
would be highly desirable to have a relatively few “mandatory state laws” that all states must
enact. . . .
To assure enactment of these state laws, Congress tied funding for states’ child support and welfare
programs to the enactment of such legislation. . . .
Since 1992, states have used UIFSA to process interstate and international child support cases. In
1996, . . . it was mandated that all states enact UIFSA to improve inter-jurisdictional case processing.
Out of deference to the role of states as the locus of jurisdiction for child support and previous success
using UIFSA to implement the interstate child support provisions of welfare reform, there was con-
sensus . . . that UIFSA would be the appropriate vehicle to integrate the treaty into U.S. law.
Implementation of the treaty through state law is more consistent with existing family law, as
well as more efficient and effective, rather than through a federal law that would govern a segregated
portion of international child support cases.33
Shortly after the Act was passed, states began enacting legislation to implement the UIFSA
2008 amendments.34
In Idaho, the legislation proved quite controversial. InMarch 2015, Idaho’s House Judiciary,
Rules and Administration Committee voted to table the bill that would implement the
Convention, expressing concern that Idaho might be forced to carry out child support decisions
(2015), IM-15-01, at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/css/resource/uniform-interstate-family-support-act-2008-and-
hague-treaty-provisions (summarizing differences between UIFSA 2008 and previous state law).
29 S. EXEC. REP. NO. 111–2, supra note 20, at 7.
30 See OFF. CHILD SUPPORT ENF’T, P.L. 113–183 UIFSA 2008 ENACTMENT, AT-14–11 (2014), at http://www.
acf.hhs.gov/css/resource/pl-113-183-uifsa-2008-enactment; U.S. Dep’t of State Press Release, President Obama
Signs Implementing Legislation for the Hague Convention on the International Recovery of Child Support and
Other Forms of Family Maintenance (Sept. 30, 2014), at http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2014/09/
232337.htm.
31 See Preventing Sex Trafficking and Strengthening Families Act, Pub. L. No. 113–183, sec. 301(f), 128 Stat.
1919, 1944–45 (2014).
32 UNIF. LAW COMM’N, supra note 27, at 1; see also Pub. L. No. 113–183, sec. 301(f), 128 Stat. at 1944–45. See
generally 42 U.S.C. § 655 (2016) (detailing payments of federal funds to states for child support programs).
33 OFF. OF CHILD SUPPORT ENF’T, UIFSA Provisions supra note 28, at 1.
34 Kirk Johnson,Negotiated at The Hague, a Child Support Treaty Falters in Boise, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 21, 2015), at
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/22/us/negotiated-at-the-hague-a-child-support-treaty-falters-in-boise.html.
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that were based on Sharia law.35 According to press reports, none of the states that are currently
parties to the Convention is formally governed by Sharia law; in addition, the Idaho attorney
general pointed out to the House Committee that the Idaho legislation would allow judges to
reject cases that fail to meet the state’s standards.36 Because of the committee’s decision, the bill
did not proceed to the full state House of Representatives for a vote, and Idaho risked losing
approximately $46million in federal funding.37 The Idaho state legislature later changed course
and approved the legislation in May 2015 after the governor called for a special session of the
legislature to reconsider the UIFSA 2008 implementing legislation.38He noted that there was “a
compelling public interest in maintaining Idaho’s established child support program” and “a
need for Idaho to operate in full compliance with the reciprocal interstate process as provided
by [UIFSA].”39 He also posted a draft version of the bill online because, he said, he “want[ed]
every member of the Legislature to have a better understanding of what it does and does not do,
and a fuller appreciation of what happens if we fail to act affirmatively.”40 Despite continued
opposition, the state congress approved the legislation on May 16, 2015.41
Implementation in the remaining states did not provoke similar controversies. After New
Jersey enacted the UIFSA 2008 amendments on March 23, 2016, all states and jurisdictions
had implemented the legislation required for compliance with federal law and the
Convention.42 Because “Article 7 of UIFSA becomes effective concurrently with the
Convention,” states “will begin to process cases with Convention countries under the require-
ments of the Convention and article 7 of . . . UIFSA” on January 1, 2017.43
35 See id.; Press Release, Idaho Gov. C.L. “Butch” Otter, Governor Expresses Concern about Child Support
Implications (Mar. 15, 2015), at https://gov.idaho.gov/mediacenter/press/pr2015/2%20Feb/ps_2.html; Katie
Zavadski, GOP to GOP: ‘Sharia Law’ Fearmongering Helping Deadbeat Dads, DAILY BEAST (Apr. 15, 2015,
4:00 PM), at http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/04/15/gop-to-gop-sharia-law-fearmongering-helping-
deadbeat-dads.html.
36 Associated Press, Sharia, Foreign Treaty Controversy Stalling Idaho Child-Support Bill, WASH. TIMES (Apr. 13,
2015), at http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/apr/13/sharia-controversy-stalling-idaho-child-support-
bi; see alsoZavadski, supra note 35. The Attorney General appeared to reference a provision in the Idaho legislation
that corresponds to Article 22(a) of the Convention, which provides that: “Recognition and enforcement of a
decision may be refused if . . . recognition and enforcement of the decision is manifestly incompatible with the
public policy (‘ordre public’) of the State addressed[.]” Hague Maintenance Convention, supra note 1.
37 See Johnson, supra note 34. Idaho would also have “los[t] access to the federal database system and tools for
enforcing $205 million a year in child support payments to Idaho children.” Press Release, Idaho Gov. C.L.
“Butch” Otter, Governor Otter Calls Special Session of Idaho Legislature on Child Support (Apr. 29, 2015),
at https://gov.idaho.gov/mediacenter/press/pr2015/2%20Feb/pr_24.html [hereinafter Otter Press Release].
38 Otter Press Release, supra note 37; C.L. “BUTCH”OTTER, PROCLAMATION (Idaho 2015), at https://gov.idaho.
gov/mediacenter/Bills/ESP.pdf [hereinafter Otter Proclamation]; see also Julie Turkewitz, Idaho Approves Child
Support Bill, Removing Treaty Roadblock, N.Y. TIMES (May 18, 2015), at http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/
19/us/idaho-approves-support-bill-removing-treaty-roadblock.html.
39 Otter Proclamation, supra note 38.
40 Press Release, Idaho Gov. C.L. “Butch” Otter, Governor Otter Posts Draft Child Support Bill for Special
Legislative Session Online (May 4, 2015), at https://gov.idaho.gov/mediacenter/press/pr2015/2%20Feb/pr_26.
html.
41 See Turkewitz, supra note 38.
42UIFSA 2008 Amendments Enacted Nationwide, UNIF. LAW COMM’N (Mar. 24, 2016), at http://www.uniform-
laws.org/NewsDetail.aspx?title=UIFSA%202008%20Amendments%20Enacted%20Nationwide.
43 OFF. CHILD SUPPORT ENF’T, PENDING EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE HAGUE CHILD SUPPORT CONVENTION AND
RESOURCES, DCL-16-12 (2016), at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/css/resource/pending-effective-date-of-the-hague-
child-support-convention-and-resources.
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